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THE STATE OF TRADE SECRET PROTECTION IN CHINA IN LIGHT OF THE USCHINA TRADE WARS:
TRADE SECRET PROTECTION IN CHINA BEFORE AND AFTER THE US-CHINA
TRADE AGREEMENT OF JANUARY 15, 2020
PAOLO BECONCINI*
I. INTRODUCTION
China’s track record when enforcing IP rights of foreign entities has been in the
U.S. and EU’s list of grievances for over two decades. The accession of China to the
WTO in 2001 and its commitment to the IP protection standards set forth in the
ancillary TRIPS agreement further escalated the degree and intensity of such disputes.
Most notably, in 2007, for the first time, the U.S. sued China before the WTO for
alleged violations of the TRIPS agreement.1
In the past three years, however, the issue of intellectual property protection in
China has played an increasingly critical role in the trade and foreign policies of the
U.S. and China. In 2018, the U.S. filed a new complaint against China before the WTO
alleging a violation of the TRIPS agreement. 2 Even more important, these old
grievances came center stage when they were cited as one of the key reasons for the
U.S. government’s decision to raise tariffs on Chinese exports, igniting the Trade war
with China.3 In particular, China has been accused of not providing sufficient statutory
and administrative tools to effectively protect foreign IP rights and to allow systemic
misappropriation of foreign IP assets and trade secrets. The struggle between China
the U.S., and to a lesser extent the EU, for the next world order centers primarily on
* © Dr. Paolo Beconcini, Squire Patton Boggs. LL.M. & B.A. University of Florence; LL.M.
University of Southern California; email: paolo.beconcini@squirepb.com. Dr. Beconcini is a Consultant
for Squire Patton Boggs, where he has headed the firm’s China Intellectual Property team since 2012.
1 Donald P. Harris, The Honeymoon is Over: Evaluating the U.S. – China WTO Intellectual
Property Complaint, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1, 96–186 (2008).
2 Request for Consultations by the United States, China — Certain Measures Concerning the
Protection of Intellectual Property Rights, WTO Doc. WT/DS542/1 (Mar. 23, 2018); Request for the
Establishment of a Panel by the United States, China — Certain Measures Concerning the Protection
of Intellectual Property Rights, WTO Doc. WT/DS542/8 (Oct. 18, 2018). On March 23, 2018 the United
States filed with the WTO a request for consultation with China about the latter’s violations of the
TRIPS agreement on protection of IP rights. The formal request from the US is contained in the WTO
document (WT/DS542/1). The negotiation with China failed, and on October 18, 2018 the US filed a
request with the WTO for the appointment of a Dispute Settlement Body (WT/DS542/8). The
documents
can
be
retrieved
from
the
WTO
website
at:
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds542_e.htm.
3 See Ana Swanson, W.T.O. Says American Tariffs on China Broke Global Trade Rules, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 15, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/15/business/economy/wto-trade-chinatrump.html#:~:text=WASHINGTON%20%E2%80%94%20A%20World%20Trade%20Organization,fil
ed%2C%20which%20argued%20that%20Mr (reporting that China legally responded to the tariffs
slammed on Chinese goods by the U.S. with its own WTO lawsuit against the U.S. alleging that the
latter’s unilateral action on tariffs violated the U.S.’s obligations under the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994) and the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes (DSU). On September 15, 2020 the WTO issued a decision siding with China
when finding that the U.S. violated the WTO rules when imposing tariffs on China).
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technological dominance, which in turn, requires control over the legal and economic
tools to exploit it. The actuality of such issues is shown by the heated race to a
successful vaccine and treatment for the Covid-19 virus and the related allegations of
espionage and patent theft and infringement among the countries involved in said
race.
In this struggle, trade secrets, the most legally vulnerable of the IP rights, have
taken center stage. Hacking, cyber-espionage, forced technology transfer and state
sanctioned industrial espionage have become the front line in the power struggle
between China and the U.S. This article aims at providing an overview of the current
state of development of China’s framework for the protection and enforcement of trade
secret rights in light of the trade wars and the U.S.-China Trade Agreement of January
2020. Additionally, this article assesses whether the changes implemented in China
will address the traditional U.S. grievances and how they will effectively impact
foreign rights holders.
Section II of this article provides an introduction to and some background on the
topic of trade secret protection in China and the current political and economic
relations between China and the U.S. Next, sections III and IV present an overview of
the statutory and regulatory history, as well as changes regarding trade secret
protection in China. In Section V, the article addresses the current state of political
affairs and analyzes the pertinent chapter and section of the China-U.S. Economic and
Trade Agreement on trade secrets and compares it to the previously introduced
legislation and regulations in China. Then Section VI addresses and analyzes China’s
planned amendments to its trade secrets regime following the U.S.-China Trade
Agreement. Section VI will also focus on some of the key disputed features of the
Chinese trade secret system, such as shifting the burden of proof, the threshold for
acceding to criminal justice and pre-litigation relief measures, and whether and to
what extent they are being addressed by China in a very recent wave of statutory and
judicial developments. The topics of section VI are not only important to policy makers
but also, and more importantly, to rights holders and practitioners. They affect the
very way trade secrets will be protected in the field, in real cases. Section VII will
briefly look at other important changes to the trade secret system that will be
introduced through official interpretations of the Supreme People’s Court. All of these
changes will have a significant impact on the ability of rights holders to effectively
enforce their rights. Section VIII will contain a recap of the main topics and will
present conclusions on whether trade secrets are now better protected in China than
before the trade wars and the U.S.-China Economic and Trade Agreement.
II. BACKGROUND
China introduced its first modern legislation on trade secret protection in the
1990s4 with the promulgation of the Anti-Unfair Competition Law (AUCL) of 1993.
4 Law Against Unfair Competition of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the
Standing
Comm.
Nat’l
People’s
Cong.,
Sept.
2,
1993),
Art.
10(3),
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/cn/cn011en.pdf [hereinafter Law Against Unfair
Competition 1993]. Prior to that, China had promulgated some provisions to protect trade secrets, but
these were categorized as State secrets belonging to the government and not subject to private
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The AUCL was then supplemented by other special provisions regarding trade secrets
in contract law, labor law, and criminal law5. However, the Chinese government has
faced difficulty with adapting these regulations to constant emerging challenges. 6
Such challenges include the liberalization and extreme mobility of the skilled labor
market and the inability of courts and the police to consistently and effectively protect
foreign trade secrets. These challenges and China’s constant need to adapt its
regulations has produced a seriously flawed system. In particular, the trade secret
enforcement system in China has often been accused of being ineffective, of setting
unreasonably high and ill-defined thresholds for criminal enforcement, 7 and of not
providing adequate damages and remedies. Furthermore, it has been accused of acting
in a politicized manner, of openly favoring Chinese businesses, and institutionalizing
the theft of foreign trade secrets by turning a blind eye to allegedly increasing
violations by public officials through subtle forms of forced disclosure in a variety of
administrative proceedings. All of these aforementioned accusations and grievances
have long since sat atop the U.S.’s and EU’s lists of suggestions and demands for what
China can do to improve its IP protection system.8
ownership. Among them, was for example the Regulations on the Issues of Science and Technology
Secrets, issued by the Central Committee of the Communist Party in 1958 and the Regulations for
Maintaining Confidentiality of Science and Technology, issued by the Central Committee of the
Communist Party in 1978. See also People's Republic Of China Intellectual Property Rights
Memorandum
Of
Understanding—1992,
TCC EXPORT,
https://tcc.export.gov/Trade_Agreements/All_Trade_Agreements/exp_005362.asp
(last
visited
1/31/2021) (only after the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Governments of
the People’s Republic of China and the Government of the United States of America on the Protection
of Intellectual Property of 1992, China committed to a sweeping reform and modernization of its IP
system including the implementation of a trade secrets regime). See also SHAN HAILING, THE
PROTECTION OF TRADE SECRETS IN CHINA 1-29 (2nd ed. 2012) (this book provides a very detailed
history of the birth of trade secret protection in China).
5 In practice, there are a plethora of other norms and administrative regulations with provisions
concerning trade secrets. See, e.g., Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Administration
of
Import
and
Export
of
Technologies
(effective
Jan.
1,
2002),
art.
13,
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/cn/cn125en.pdf; Regulations of the People’s Republic of
China on Customs Protection of Intellectual Property Rights (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
People’s Cong., effective Mar. 1, 2004), art. 4, http://english.customs.gov.cn/Statics/d95ecac5-4be94d69-b71f-c77169e73360.html. There are also examples of local regulations on trade secret protection
like those issued by special economic zones like Shenzhen and Zhuhai, which promulgated such laws
in the late nineties.
6 SHAN HAILING, supra note 4, at 279.
7 See Off. of the U.S. Trade Rep., United States Files WTO Case Against China Over Prohibited
Subsidies, THE USTR ARCHIVES (Feb. 2, 2007), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/pressoffice/press-releases/archives/2007/february/united-states-files-wto-case-against-chi. In April 2007,
the U.S., through its Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) filed a case with the
WTO accusing China of non-compliance with the TRIPS agreement. Among the accusations in the
case was that China set unreasonably high thresholds for access to criminal enforcement for
trademark and copyright infringement.
8 See Comprehensive Agreement on Investment, EU-China, Dec. 30, 2020,
https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2020/december/tradoc_159242.pdf. Most recently, this topic of
trade secrets and forced technology transfer was addressed by the EU-China Comprehensive
Agreement on investments (CAI). See also Paolo Beconcini, China’s Recent Trade Investment
Agreement with the EU and the Impact of its Provisions on Forced Technology Transfer, UIC RIPL
(Jan. 27, 2021), https://ripl.jmls.uic.edu/2021/01/27/chinas-recent-trade-investment-agreement-withthe-eu-and-the-impact-of-its-provisions-on-forced-technology-transfer/ (outlining the recent EUChina CAI agreement).
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However, in the last few years, a series of systemic economic changes and
increasing external political pressure from the West has inspired China’s trade secret
regime to evolve at a “quicker than expected” rate. In particular, the evolution of the
Chinese economic system from the world’s factory to world innovator and an economic
power has increased the pressure on China to provide more effective protection of
foreign trade secrets in reciprocity for protection of its domestic brands expanding
business abroad. 9 On the other hand, it is alleged that the pace of economic and
technological competition with the West is pushing China to use economic policies and
plans to cover illicit, government-sanctioned intellectual property and trade secret
theft, for instance in the case of the Thousand Talents Plan. 10 Another Chinese
government policy that has recently come under scrutiny is the “Made in China 2025”
policy, 11 aimed at reducing China’s dependence on imported technologies in ten
prioritized industries including robotics and AI, IT, aviation, railway transport,
biopharma, and many others.12 The mounting tensions and increasing number of trade
9 Xi Jinping’s Speech at the 25th Study Session of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee,
XINHUA NEWS AGENCY (Dec. 1, 2020), http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2020-12/01/content_5566183.htm.
In a most recent speech at the 25th Study Session of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee
of the Communist party, General Secretary Xi Jinping emphasized that: “Innovation is the first
driving force leading development and protecting intellectual property rights is protecting
innovation.” The text of the speech was published on January 31, 2021 in “Seeking truth Magazine”
and can be found via the link at the beginning of this footnote.
10 See Zhen Shuji, The "Thousand Talents Plan" suddenly disappeared after many arrested by the
US, RFI (July 5, 2020), https://www.rfi.fr/cn (reporting on the alleged institutionalized IP theft system
is the so called Thousand Talents Program ( 千人计划 ), launched back in 2008 by the Chinese
government. The program, aimed at recruiting international experts and talents in the scientific field
for improving China’s innovation capacities, has been accused of being a vehicle for government
sanctioned espionage and IP theft. Interestingly, there have been very recent reports that the
Thousand talents program has disappeared from the Chinese internet. According to Taiwan’s Apple
Daily, as early as September 2018, it was reported that the Chinese authorities had ordered the official
media to suspend the promotion and reporting of the "Thousand Talents Plan”).
11 See The State Council of The People’s Republic of China, Made in China 2025,
ENGLISH.GOV.CN, http://english.www.gov.cn/2016special/madeinchina2025/ (last visited on Jan. 14,
2021). In May 2015, the Chinese government launched “Made in China 2025,” a state-led industrial
policy seeking to make China the world leader in global high-tech research and manufacturing. The
program offers Chinese companies government subsidies, and intellectual property acquisition to
surpass the West in advanced key industries. See also Else B. Kania, Made in China 2025, Explained,
THE DIPLOMAT (Feb. 1, 2019), https://thediplomat.com/2019/02/made-in-china-2025-explained/ (the
author explains that the Made in China 2025 policy is “but one key piece of a complex architecture of
plans and policies aimed at generating ‘innovation-driven development,’ an agenda that has emerged
as a clear priority under Xi Jinping’s leadership.”).
12 WHITE HOUSE OFF. OF TRADE AND MFG. POLICY, HOW CHINA’S ECONOMIC AGGRESSION
THREATENS THE TECHNOLOGIES AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OF THE UNITED STATES AND THE
WORLD (June 2018), https://china.usc.edu/sites/default/files/article/attachments/white-house-chinathreatens-us-intellectual-property-2018-06.pdf. In this report, physical theft by Chinese employees is
listed as the most traditional and also most common form of IP theft. However, new threats are
emerging; those including cyber-espionage, the evasion of U.S. export control laws, and the
implementation of intrusive regulatory gambits to force technology and IP transfers to Chinese
government officials or forced business partners in key industries. Interestingly, the report includes
“reverse engineering” as a trade secret theft practice of China. Frankly, this is puzzling. Reverse
engineering is common everywhere, it is legal in itself and it is indeed a source of how technology
further develops. It is evident that the White House document was politically framed to provide
justification to the trade tariffs. Nonetheless, it correctly pointed out some critical flaws in the Chinese
trade secret protection system. Even to the most objective and unbiased friends of China, it is evident
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secret theft cases by Chinese individuals caused the U.S. to announce in July 2018 that
it was increasing tariffs on Chinese goods. This move was an act of retaliation by the
U.S., blatantly seeking to sanction China for its alleged disregard of U.S. companies’
intellectual property rights. This then escalated into a full-blown trade war that
triggered the U.S. to implement initiatives aimed at curbing trade secret theft by
China within the U.S. Among those initiatives, and possibly the most remarkable, was
the November 2018 China Initiative13 launched by the U.S. Department of Justice. The
China Initiative ushered in a number of high-profile trade secret theft cases in the U.S.
This article aims at surveying recent changes in China’s trade secret regime
during the trade war period, starting from the 2019 amendment to the AUCL’s
provisions on trade secrets, passing through the U.S.-China Economic and Trade
Agreement (hereafter referred to as the Phase I Agreement), 14 to the latest 2020
interpretations and provisions by the Supreme People’s Court. In particular, the article
will focus on some critical aspects of trade secret protection in China that have been at
the center of the U.S.-China trade war and evaluate whether the recent legislative and
judicial changes in China have had a positive effect on the day-to-day protection and
enforcement of foreign trade secrets in China.
III. TRADE WARS AND CHINA’S REFORM OF ITS TRADE SECRET LAWS
In April 2019, partly in order to respond to the U.S. government’s allegations and
to facilitate the negotiation of a deal to end the trade wars, China amended the trade
secret provisions in its 1993 Anti-Unfair Competition Law (AUCL). Among the most
remarkable changes was the expansion of the definition of trade secret, the inclusion
of hacking as an act of infringement, the increased number of vicarious liabilities for
third parties, and a number of presumptions to shift the burden of proof to the
defendants.
The amendments were not, however, enough to broker a final deal, sending the
trade disputes to go on for another nine months. Finally, China and the U.S. agreed
on a truce with the execution of the Economic and Trade Agreement of January 15,
2020. 15 The agreement, also known as the Phase I Agreement, contains a whole
chapter dedicated to the protection of trade secrets.16 Interestingly enough, the U.S.
agrees on reciprocity of treatment, but all of the clauses are specifically directed to

that such practices exist and that there has been at least indirect placet (or a blind eye) by the Chinese
government to the lax application of its laws on trade secrets and to the delay in their modernization
for the sake of achieving certain grand economic policies.
13 U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., THE CHINA INITIATIVE (2018), https://www.justice.gov/opa/informationabout-department-justice-s-china-initiative-and-compilation-china-related. The China Initiative was
launched by the U.S. Department of Justice in November 2018 and involved the investigation and
prosecution of cases of IP and trade secret theft by Chinese individuals and entities. It does so by
identifying and prosecuting trade-secret and intellectual property (IP) theft, hacking, and economic
espionage.
14
Economic
and
Trade
Agreement,
U.S.-China,
art.
1.6,
Jan.
15,
2020,
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/agreements/phase%20one%20agreement/Economic_And_Trad
e_Agreement_Between_The_United_States_And_China_Text.pdf. [hereinafter Phase I Agreement].
15 Zhen Shuji, supra note 10.
16 Phase I Agreement, supra note 14, ch.1, sec. B.
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China. As a result, China committed to further raise the level of trade secret protection
as specifically requested by the Phase I agreement.
Even though some of the Phase I Agreement’s provisions were already
implemented in the 2019 amendment to the AUCL, 17 there are some other critical
stipulations of this agreement that have not yet been implemented by the Chinese
government. After more than six months, China has not implemented any legislation
that fully addresses all the stipulations of the Phase I Agreement. This is not
surprising, as many of the stipulated changes seemingly rely more on implementing
administrative regulations and processes, rather than creating new laws. 18
Interestingly, the only recent legislation also concerning trade secrets is an amended
set of norms of the Criminal Procedure Law of China that finds no corresponding
counterpart in the Phase I Agreement.19 These new norms provide instead for harsher
punishment of foreign individuals or entities stealing secrets from China. The new
clauses target any person or company that “steals, spies, buys, or illegally provides
trade secrets to foreign institutions, organizations, and personnel.”20 This seems to be
China’s way of responding to the U.S.’s implementation of the China Initiative.21 Also,
these new norms may be a sign that China is reacting to the U.S. reconfiguring its
espionage and cyber policies to become more defense-oriented during the Trump
administration.22
In this legislative limbo, on June 10, 2020, the Supreme People’s Court took the
initiative to address trade secret protection and the Phase I Agreement’s stipulations
by releasing a draft of a binding judicial interpretation titled “Several Issues
concerning the Application of Law in the Trial of Civil Cases Involving Disputes over

17 See Mark Cohen, The Phase I Agreement: Its fans and Discontents, CHINA IPR (Jan. 21, 2020),
https://chinaipr.com/2020/01/21/the-phase-1-ip-agreement-its-fans-and-discontents/. This is not the
only inconsistency in the drafting of the Phase I Agreement. Mark Cohen pointed out that the many
textual inconsistencies, the misplaced focus on certain IP issues rather than others had made “many
people speculate that the negotiators on the US side and/or the Chinese side may not have been
adequately consulting with experts, bringing to mind the Chinese expression of building a chariot
while the door is closed (without consulting others).”
18 Past agreements on IP matters with China were frustrated by the difficulty of having these
international stipulations translated into efficient administrative processes in China. Such
experiences should be cautionary tales to those placing excessive hopes on such agreements.
19 (中华人民共和国刑法修正案（十一), 中华人民共和国主席令第 66 号, (2020 年 12 月 26 日第十三届
全国人民代表大会常务委员会第二十四次会议通过)) [Amendment XI to the <Criminal Law of the
People's Republic of China>, Order of the President of the People's Republic of China No. 66 [2020]]
(adopted at the 24th meeting of the Standing Comm. of the 13th Nat’l People's Cong., Dec. 26, 2020),
http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/c30834/202012/850abff47854495e9871997bf64803b6.shtml
[hereinafter
Amendment XI to the Criminal Law].
20 Id. art. 23 (author translation from the original Chinese text of the draft amendments: "Where
commercial secrets are stolen, spied upon, sold, or illegally provided to overseas institutions,
organizations, or persons, a sentence of up to 5 years imprisonment or short-term detention is given,
and/or a fine; and where the circumstances are serious, the sentence is to be 5 years or more
imprisonment and a concurrent fine.").
21 Cissy Zhou, China sharpens economic espionage penalties in ‘tit-for-tat provision’ against US
accusations of trade secret theft, SOUTHERN CHINA MORNING POST (July 13, 2020, 7:30PM),
https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3092939/china-sharpens-economic-espionagepenalties-tit-tat-provision.
22 JOHN BOLTON, THE ROOM WHERE IT HAPPENED, 174–180 (Simon & Schuster 2020).
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Trade Secret Infringement”23 (hereafter referred to as “the 2020 Draft Interpretation”).
This draft was then formally adopted on August 24, 2020 and effective as of September
12, 2020 (hereafter referred to as the 2020 Interpretation). 24 Seven days after the
issuance of the 2020 Draft Interpretation, the Supreme People’s Court intervened
again to address trade secret protection by issuing an updated version of the
“Provisions for the determination of the thresholds for initiating criminal prosecution
of trade secret theft crimes”25 (hereafter referred to as the “2020 Provisions”). The 2020
Interpretation and 2020 Provisions are legally binding on all Chinese judges, police
officers, and criminal procurators deciding cases of trade secret infringement. These
are indeed the most critical, though not the most recent regulations on trade secrets
after the amendment of the AUCL in 2019. 26 An analysis of their content and a
comparison with the trade secret provisions of the Phase I Agreement is therefore
necessary and forthcoming.
IV. THE 2019 AMENDMENT OF THE TRADE SECRET PROVISIONS IN THE CHINA UNFAIR
COMPETITION LAW
The amendments of the 1993 AUCL were enacted on April 23, 2019.27 Among the
awaited amendments was the inclusion of “commercial information” other than
23 People's Court News and Media Headquarters, The Supreme People's Court publicly solicits
opinions on three judicial documents, CHINACOURT (Jun. 10, 2020) (translated by Google),
https://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2020/06/id/5289821.shtml?from=singlemessage&isappinsta
lled=0%20(last%20visited%2019:47%2011/6/2020).
24 Fa Shi [2020] No. 7 (最高人民法院关于审理侵犯商业秘密民事案件适用法律若干问题的规定, 法释
[2020]7 号, 生效日期：2020 年 09 月 12) [Provisions of the Sup. People’s Ct. on Several Issues
Concerning the Application of <Law in the Trial of Civil Cases of Trade Secret Infringement>,
[2020]] (effective Sept. 12, 2020),
https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1677544158014759321&wfr=spider&for=pc [hereinafter 2020
Interpretation].
25 (最高
、公安部就《关于修改〈最高人民 察院 公安部关于公安机关管 的刑事案件立案追
准的 定（二）〉侵犯商 秘密案立案追
准的 充 定（征求意 稿）》向社会公开征集意 )
[Supplemental Provisions on Revising the Standards for the Filing and Prosecution of Trade Secret
Infringement Cases in the Provisions (II) of the Supreme People's Procuratorate and the Ministry of
Public Security on the Standards for the Filing and Prosecution of Criminal Cases under the
Jurisdiction
of
Public
Security
Authorities]
(Draft
for
Comment)
(July
2020),
https://www.spp.gov.cn/spp/tzgg1/202007/t20200710_472730.shtml [hereinafter 2020 Provisions].
26 (商业秘密保护规定（征求意见稿)) [Notice of the State Admin. for Market Reg. on the Public
Comment on the “Provisions on the Protection of Trade Secrets” (Draft for Comment)] (promulgated
by the State Admin. For Market Reg.., Sept. 4, 2020, rev’d Oct. 18, 2020),
http://www.chinalaw.gov.cn/government_public/content/2020-09/04/657_3255348.html.
The
provisions are binding upon all administrative bodies enforcing trade secret rights and aims at
improving efficiency and efficacy of administrative enforcement, since now the least use and least
effective enforcement tool against trade secret violations. This draft has no rank of law and is also of
limited scope compared to the issues dealt with by the cited Interpretations and Provisions of the
Supreme People’s Court. Nonetheless, it is a proof of the current commitment to improve IP and trade
secret protection at government and judicial level.
27 (中华人民共和国反不正当竞争法(2019 修正) [现行有效]) [Anti-Unfair Competition Law of the
People’s Republic of China (2019 Amendment)] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s
Cong.,
effective
Apr.
23,
2019),
art.
9(4),
https://www.hongfanglaw.com/wpcontent/uploads/2019/10/Anti-Unfair-Competition-Law-of-the-Peoples-Republic-of-China-2019AmendmentEnglish.pdf [hereinafter Anti-Unfair Competition Law 2019].
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“technical or operational” information in the trade secret definition, thus removing any
lingering doubt as to the scope of information that may constitute a trade secret.28 The
trade secret definition in the old AUCL did not include commercial information. This
allows a larger variety of commercial data and know-how to be protected under the
AUCL umbrella. Also, the older AUCL required that a secret, to be protectable, had to
bring economic benefit to the owner.29 The amended version from 2019 requires only
that the trade secret has commercial value, which, before the reform was just one of
the sub-categories of “economic benefit.”30 This creates a lower burden of proof when
establishing this requirement, to the obvious benefit of the rights holder, especially in
relation to commercial rather than technical secrets.31 However, in a December 16,
2019 decision, the Supreme Court reduced the scope of commercial secrets by excluding
protection for mere customer lists, even if included in executed confidentiality
agreements.32 In particular, the binding precedent established that customer names,
product names, product specifications, sales order quantities, unit prices, contact
people, phone numbers, addresses, etc., are information that can be, in good part,
compiled from open sources. While the 2019 AUCL requires that “commercial
information” contain some “special information” to qualify as a trade secret. The Court
added examples of what is meant by “special information”: a customer list, to be
considered a trade secret, must include the customer’s specific purchasing habits,
intentions and other in-depth information – not just past order information. The new
law and the following interpretation by the Supreme People’s Court on this critical
aspect seem to have provided clarity and consistency.
At the same time, the amendment expanded the definition of infringer. Whereby
the previous norms only referred to business operators, the new law defines the
infringer as “a business operator or any other natural person, legal person or
unincorporated organization.” 33 This will eliminate doubts about whether, for
Id.
Law Against Unfair Competition 1993, supra note 4, art. 10(3).
30 (最高人民法院关于审理不正当竞争民事案件应用法律若干问题的解释 (2007.1.12)) [Interpretation
of the Sup. People’s Ct. on Several Issues Concerning the Application of <Law in the Trial of Civil
Cases of Unfair Competition>, Judicial Interpretation No. 2 [2007]] (promulgated by the Judicial
Comm. Of the Sup. People’s Ct., Jan. 12, 2007, effective Feb. 1, 2007), https://www.ccpitpatent.com.cn/zh-hans/node/11541/11540 (China) [hereinafter Interpretation on Law of Unfair
Competition] (the court defined economic benefit as existing when the related information has
practical or potential commercial value and can be used for enhancing the competitive advantage for
the right holder).
31 (最高人民法院关于审理侵犯商业秘密纠纷民事案件 应用法律若干问题的解释（征求意见稿）)
[Interpretation of the Sup. People’s Ct. on Several Issues Concerning the Application of the <Law on
Trial of Civil Cases Concerning Trade Secret Infringement Disputes>, (Draft for comments)] (issued
June
10,
2020),
art.
3,
https://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2020/06/id/5289821.shtml?from=singlemessage&isappinsta
lled=0%20(last%20visited%2019:47%2011/6/2020) [hereinafter 2020 Draft Interpretation] (expressly
indicated that potential commercial value is sufficient to meet this standard, thus further lowering
the burden of proof and expanding access to protection, especially for commercial secret holders).
32 (麦达可尔（天津）科技有限公司、华某 1 兴科技（天津）集团有限公司侵害商业秘密纠纷再审民事
判决书(2019)最高法民再 268 号) [Mai Da Keer (Tianjin) Tech. Co., Ltd. v. Huayang Xinxing Technology
(Tianjin) Group Co., Ltd., Civil Judgment for Retrial of Trade Secret Infringement Dispute], (2019)
Sup.
Fa
Min
Zai
No.
268
(Sup.
People’s
Ct.
2019)
(China),
http://tonghanggongsi.com/Case/detail/id/3473.html.
33 Anti-Unfair Competition Law 2019, supra note 27, art. 2.
28
29

[20:108 2021]

UIC Review of Intellectual Property Law

116

example, a single person hacking for resale of stolen secrets is a business operator. In
this respect, the law has further listed “hacking” as a specific conduct in violation of
trade secrets.34 In addition, the new amendment lightens the burden of proof of the
victim of a trade secret violation by providing a presumption of infringement. The lack
of such a presumption in the past was a serious obstacle that often-restrained foreign
rights holders from taking legal action in China. The new amendment also introduces
changes to the law on damage compensation. In particular, punitive damages for
repeating infringers were raised from a maximum of three times the illicit profit to a
maximum of five times the same, while the upper ceiling for statutory damages raised
from RMB1 million to RMB5 million.35
In spite of so many positive amendments, pressure continued to mount on China
to push for more reform during the latter half of 2019.
V. TRADE SECRETS IN THE U.S.-CHINA TRADE AGREEMENT OF JANUARY 2020 (PHASE I
AGREEMENT)
The dispute on trade secret protection in China came to a new head with the trade
war truce between the U.S. and China at the beginning of 2020, and the signing of the
Phase I Agreement. Chapter I of the Phase I Agreement is dedicated to the protection
of intellectual property in China. Section B of Chapter I specifically concerns the
protection of trade secrets in China and the acceptance of equivalent treatment by the
U.S.36
Interestingly, most of the Section B provisions and the underlying legal issues
have already been satisfactorily addressed by the 2019 amendments of the AUCL. For
example, the requirement in the Phase I Agreement to expressly include “commercial
business information” in the definition of trade secret has been addressed by both the
amended version of the AUCL and the abundant case law of the Supreme People’s
Court.37 The same applies to the stipulation in article 1.3 of Chapter I, Section B of the
Id. art. 9(1).
See Paolo Beconcini, Changes in China Concerning the Trademark Law and the Trade Secret
Provisions of the Anti-Unfair Competition Law Address Concerns of Western Countries, IPTECHBLOG
(Apr. 30, 2019), https://www.iptechblog.com/2019/04/changes-in-china-concerning-the-trademarklaw-and-the-trade-secret-provisions-of-the-anti-unfair-competition-law-address-concerns-of-westerncountries/.
36 Phase I Agreement, supra note 14, art. 1.6. For example, article 1.3(3) Chapter I, Section B
states where the U.S. commits to provide equivalent treatment when extending liabilities for trade
secret violation to both entities and private individuals or when the definition of operator should
include natural persons, groups of natural persons and legal persons. The same reference to a U.S.
guarantee of reciprocal treatment is provided in article 1.4 Chapter I, Section B, enumerating the type
of acts that shall constitute trade secret infringement, among them, hacking. Other examples of the
U.S. commitment on affording equivalent treatment are those concerning shifting of the burden of
proof (Art. 1.5 Chapter I, Section B), those concerning the availability of preliminary and interim
measures (Art. 1.6 Chapter I, Section B), and those regarding misappropriation of trade secrets by
government authorities and agents (Art. 1.9 Chapter I, Section B).
37 Anti-Unfair Competition Law 2019, supra note 27, art. 9(4). See, e.g., (青岛麦某机械设备进出口
有限公司、徐某侵害经营秘密纠纷再审审查与审判监督民事裁定书 (2020) 最高法民申 401 号) [Qingdao
Maimou Machinery Equipment Imp. & Exp. Co., Ltd., Xu and Liu v. Shandong Bo Pump
Electromechanical Imp. & Exp. Co., Ltd., Civil Judgment for Infringement of Business Information],
(2020) Zui Gao Fa Min Shen No. 401 (Sup. People’s Ct. 2020) (China). In this judgment, the Supreme
34
35
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Phase I Agreement to extend the definition of “business operator” to private
individuals. The same further applies to article 1.4 of Chapter I, Section B of the Phase
I Agreement requiring China to include the breach or inducement of a breach of duty
not to disclose information that is secret or intended to be kept secret, as well as the
addition of electronic intrusion (hacking) among the forms of infringement.38 Article
1.5 of Chapter I, Section B of the Phase I Agreement has been at least in part addressed
by article 32 of the AUCL in its 2019 amended version, as well.39 Both norms provide
for the shifting of the burden of proof in civil proceedings where there is a reasonable
basis to conclude that a trade secret infringement has occurred. The presence of such
outdated and redundant requirements in the Phase I Agreement can only be explained
by the rush of the U.S. drafters to get the deal done without proper consultation with
experts from the private sector.

People’s Court affirmed that the relevant information about the Ministry of National Economy and
Finance of Sudan constitutes “trade secrets” for the following reasons:
a. such information is not known by the public as the plaintiff submitted four
contracts signed between 2003 and 2005 with the Sudanese Ministry of National
Economy and Finance, which can reflect the long-term stable transactions between
them, and also constitutes special customer information such as special needs for
models, transaction prices, and other transaction habits that differ from the
publicly known information…. The other party only submitted evidence such as the
notarization of Internet news about the signing of water supply project contracts
between Sudan and Chinese companies to try to support their claim that the above
information is publicly known. However, the content of the web pages in the
notarization cannot reflect the in-depth information of the involved trade secrets.
In summary, the relevant information of the Sudanese Ministry of National
Economy and Finance meets the two requirements of "not generally known and
easily available to relevant personnel in the field to which it belongs" and can be
determined as "not known to the public…. b. this information could bring economic
benefits for the right owner as the plaintiff’s evidence could prove that it conducted
actual transactions with the specific customers based on the relevant information
about the Ministry of National Economy and Finance of Sudan (…) c. the plaintiff
already took confidential measures as the plaintiff provided shareholders
resolution to show the defendant acted as the director and manager of the plaintiff,
and the directors and the managements have mandatory confidentiality obligations
for the company’s trade secrets.
See also (麦达可尔（天津）科技有限公司、华某 1 兴科技（天津）集团有限公司侵害商业秘密纠纷再审民
事 判 决 书 (2019) 最 高 法 民 再 268 号 ) [Mai Da Keer (Tianjin) Tech. Co., Ltd. v. Huayang Xinxing
Technology (Tianjin) Group Co., Ltd., Civil Judgment for Retrial of Trade Secret Infringement
Dispute], (2019) Sup. Fa Min Zai No. 268 (Sup. People’s Ct. 2019) (China),
http://tonghanggongsi.com/Case/detail/id/3473.html (in this decision, the Supreme People’s Court
recognized that customer names, product names, product specifications, sales order quantities, unit
prices, contact personnel, telephone numbers and addresses qualified as protectable commercial trade
secrets.).
38 Phase I Agreement, supra note 14, art. 1.4.
39 Anti-Unfair Competition Law 2019, supra note 27, art. 32; see also Phase I Agreement, supra
note 14, art. 1.5 (outlining a burden shifting process during a civil proceeding for trade secret
misappropriation that is similar to what is stated in article 32 of China’s Anti-Unfair Competition
Law).
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However, there are still provisions of the Phase I Agreement that have not been
fully addressed or clarified by the earlier amendment of the AUCL. Here are some
examples.
For instance, although shifting the burden of proof was addressed in part by the
2019 amendments to the AUCL, many issues remain unclear and some important
issues have not been addressed at all. Article 1.5(2)(a) of Chapter I, Section B of the
Phase I Agreement requires that the burden of proof must shift to the accused party
to show that it did not misappropriate a trade secret once a holder of a trade secret
produces:
(i) evidence that the accused party had access or opportunity to obtain
a trade secret and the information used by the accused party is
materially the same as that trade secret;
(ii) evidence that a trade secret has been or risks being disclosed or
used by the accused party; or
(iii) other evidence that its trade secret(s) were misappropriated by the
accused party.40
Article 1.5(2)(b) stipulates that when the rights holder provides preliminary evidence
that measures were taken to keep the claimed trade secret confidential, the burden of
proof or burden of production of evidence, as appropriate, shifts to the accused party
to show that a trade secret identified by a rights holder is generally known among
persons within the circles that normally deal with the kind of information in question
or is readily accessible, and therefore is not a trade secret.41 All these provisions are
necessary if a proper and fair shift of the burden of proof is to be realized in practice.
In the next section we will try to find out if and how the full implementation of the
above provisions of article 1.5 of the Phase I Agreement have been addressed by the
2019 AUCL and, more importantly, by the 2020 Draft Interpretation of the Supreme
People’s Court.
Another example is article 1.7 of Chapter I, Section B of the Phase I Agreement.
This provision deals with the thresholds to initiate criminal enforcement against trade
secret theft. In particular, this provision requires China to better and clearly define
the threshold of the “great loss” requirement for the commandment of criminal
enforcement as well as eliminate the requirement of “actual losses” to commence such
proceedings.42
Another important provision of the Phase I Agreement that needs to be addressed
by China is that concerning the implementation of procedures and penalties to ensure
that trade secrets shared in the course of administrative proceedings are not misused
or leaked by public officials. Article 1.9 provides that China shall prohibit the
unauthorized disclosure of trade secrets or confidential business information by
Phase I Agreement, supra note 14, art. 1.5(1)-(2)(a).
Id. art. 1.5(2)(b) (“China shall provide that: (b) under the circumstance that the right holder
provides preliminary evidence that measures were taken to keep the claimed trade secret confidential,
the burden of proof or burden of production of evidence, as appropriate, shifts to the accused party to
show that a trade secret identified by a holder is generally known among persons within the circles
that normally deal with the kind of information in question or is readily accessible, and therefore is
not a trade secret.”).
42 Id. art. 1.7.
40
41
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government personnel or third party experts or advisors in any criminal, civil,
administrative, or regulatory proceedings conducted at either the central or subcentral levels of government in which such information is submitted. 43 Among the
typical proceedings are forced joint ventures with local partners in key industrial
sectors, technological or quality licensing and certification proceedings, and various
other administrative proceedings. This provision addresses the repeated allegation by
the U.S. government that Chinese administrations use such proceedings to extort
know-how and resell it to Chinese competitors.
Eventually, article 1.6 of Chapter I, Section B of the Phase I Agreement requires
both parties to provide prompt and effective provisional measures to prevent the use
of misappropriated trade secrets.44 The provision expressly requires China to identify
the use or attempted use of claimed trade secret information as an “urgent situation”
(periculum in mora) that would allow the Chinese judges to grant a preliminary
injunction based on the specific facts and circumstances of a case.45 China has since
long implemented a preliminary injunction and evidence preservation system to
protect IP rights before and during litigation of infringement disputes. The question is
to determine whether the Phase I Agreement is imposing on China additional
obligations to further change and improve such system compared to the already
existing norms and procedures.
VI. THE INTERVENTION OF THE SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT IN 2020
The Supreme People’s Court’s 2020 Draft Interpretation (fully adopted in August
2020) and the July 2020 Provisions are the most recent and most detailed regulations
issued in China on trade secret protection after the 2019 AUCL and the Phase I
Agreement. Both judicial regulations are now fully binding on all Chinese judges,
police, and procurators and will have a concrete effect on the standards that will then
apply to the enforcement of trade secret rights in China. But a question still exists: has
the Supreme People’s Court used such opportunity to address the various issues
highlighted in the preceding paragraphs? The following explores this question. To this
purpose, we will reference the finally adopted 2020 Interpretation text when
conducting our analysis. We will also reference the 2020 Draft Interpretation when
relevant differences arise.
A. Shifting of the Burden of Proof
Article 32 of the AUCL already provides for a judge to order the shifting of the
burden of proof under two main circumstances: a) when the holder of a trade secret
right can prove prima facie that they have taken measures to maintain the
confidentiality of its secret; and b) they can reasonably indicate (prima facie proof) that
such secret has been infringed.46 In this case, the alleged infringer will have to prove
Id. art. 1.9.
Id. art. 1.6.
45 Phase I Agreement, supra note 14, art. 1.6.
46 Anti-Unfair Competition Law 2019, supra note 27, art. 32.
43
44
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that the claimed secret does not fall within the scope of trade secrets as provided in
the AUCL. The second paragraph of this provision further defines the requirement of
prima facie proof of infringement by listing a number of presumptions of infringement:
i) the alleged infringer had access to or opportunity to obtain such secrets and the
information used by the alleged infringer is substantially identical to such secrets; ii)
there is evidence showing that such secrets have been or have the possibility of being
published or used by the alleged infringer; and iii) there is any other evidence showing
that such commercial secrets have been infringed by the alleged infringer.47
The above provision seems to cover most of the requirements of article 1.5(1)–(3)
of Chapter 1, Section B of the Phase I Agreement. In particular, the final open clause
of article 32 allows for stretching the application of the clause to a multitude of
additional situations. However, the problem with open clauses in China is that they
will rely on the judges’ own discretion, and judges are not likely to exercise them until
the Supreme People’s Court intervenes with an interpretation. Aside from this, two
more important features highlighted in the Phase I Agreement were not addressed by
article 32 of the AUCL. One is that article 32 of the AUCL does not precisely define
critical terms such as “opportunity to obtain” and “substantial identity.” The other
issue is that article 32 of the AUCL does not regulate the presumption set forth by
article 1.5(b) of Chapter I, Section B of the Phase I Agreement. That being the case,
has the Supreme People’s Court filled the gap by addressing such points in its June
10, 2020 draft Interpretation?
Article 12 of the 2020 Interpretation lists a number of factors that the civil judges
should consider when determining whether an employee or ex-employee had the
opportunity to obtain the alleged trade secret, namely: (1) job title, responsibility, and
authorization; (2) job content or assignment; (3) specific participation in
manufacturing and operating activities related to trade secrets, and (4) whether they
could have or did ever access, obtain, control, keep in custody, store, or copy trade
secret materials. 48 This intervention seems to provide sufficient clarification of the
term “opportunity to obtain.”49 We can expect that judges will be effectively able to rely
on such interpretation in their decision-making process to the benefit of the rights
holders, which will have the burden to provide the above information and see then the
burden shift over to their adversary. In practice, rights holders should keep good and
orderly records of all the above facts so as to be able to provide them in support of their
case before a Chinese judge. Internal processes should be set in place to keep such
records and to clearly define functions and entrusted information as “trade secretId. art. 32(1)–(3).
2020 Interpretation, supra note 24, art. 12. The English translation of article 12 of the 2020
Draft Interpretation reads:
47

48

If the people's court determines whether an employee or former employee has a
channel or opportunity to obtain the trade secret claimed by the right holder, he
may consider the following factors related to it: (1) duties, duties and authorities;
(2) the job or the task assigned by the unit; (3) the specific circumstances of
participation in production and business activities related to trade secrets; (4)
whether or have been able to access, contact, obtain, control, store, store, and copy
trade secrets and their carriers; (5) other factors to be considered.
49

Anti-Unfair Competition Law 2019, supra note 27, art. 32.
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sensitive.” This should start with the employment agreement and the related trade
secret and confidentiality policies and then include concrete markings of documents
and the installation of appropriate tracking software.
Article 13(1) of the 2020 Interpretation provides for shifting of the burden of proof
if the claimant can prove that there is no “substantive difference” between the alleged
infringing information and the trade secret claimed by the rights holder.50 The draft
also provides a list of factors the judge will need to evaluate when determining the
similarity between the relevant information.51 It will again be the burden of the rights
holder to present these factors to the court in order to shift the burden of proof. In this
respect, we can say that the 2020 Interpretation is addressing this other open issue of
article 32 of the AUCL.
In addition to the above provisions, the 2020 Interpretation provides additional
guidance to judges when determining the sufficiency of the evidence concerning the
confidential measures put in place by the rights holder. Article 5 of the 2020
Interpretation lists the factors a judge must consider when determining whether the
measures in its specific case were appropriate,52 while article 6 lists the means by
50 2020 Interpretation, supra note 24, art. 13. English Translation: “If there is no substantive
difference between the alleged infringing information and the trade secret claimed by the right holder,
the people's court may determine that the alleged infringing information and the trade secret
constitute the substantially the same as stated in Article 32, paragraph 2, of the Anti-Unfair
Competition Law.”
51 Id. art. 13(2). Article 13(2) provides guidance to the judge in order to determine the “similarity”
between the information used by the accused party and the content of the trade secret:

When the people's court determines whether it is substantially the same, it shall
comprehensively consider the following factors: 1) the degree of similarities and
differences between the infringed information and the trade secret; 2) if it is easy
for the relevant personnel in the field to think of this difference when the alleged
infringement occurs; 3) if there is a substantial difference between the alleged
infringing information and the commercial secret in the purpose, use method,
purpose, effect, etc. 4) information about trade secrets in the public domain; and 5)
Other factors to be considered.
Article 14 of the 2020 Draft Interpretation was slightly different in that it embodied point 3) in article
13 as a requirement for the similarity/non-similarity determination rather than one of the guidance
features as now present in article 13. In practice, however, there should not be any difference as to
the scope and applicability of this provision.
52 Id. art. 5(2). Article 5(2) of the draft interpretation provides that:
The people’s court shall determine whether the right holder has adopted
corresponding secrecy based on factors such as the nature of the trade secret and
its carrier, the commercial value of the trade secret, the identifiable degree of
confidentiality measures, the degree of correspondence between the confidentiality
measures and trade secrets, and the right holder’s willingness to keep confidential
measures.
The provision is less specific than that of the article 6(3) of the 2020 Draft Interpretation.
For the determination of the corresponding confidential measures, the people's court may
consider the following factors comprehensively: a) the nature of the trade secret carrier; b)
the right holder's willingness to keep secret; c) recognition of confidentiality measures; d) the
degree of matching of confidentiality measures with trade secrets; and e) how easy/difficult
it is for others to obtain trade secrets through improper means. The major difference seems
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which confidentiality can be established between employer and employee. 53 Both
provisions provide a helpful set of standards that will reduce the judge’s discretion and
increase consistency and predictability in the judicial decision-making process.
However, none of these provisions address the case of article 1.5(b) of Section B,
Chapter I of the Phase I Agreement.
Article 8 of the 2020 Draft Interpretation seems to add additional criteria for the
shifting of the burden of proof that are even more favorable than those of article 32 of
the AUCL. Eventually, this provision of the 2020 Draft Interpretation was deleted
from the final text of the 2020 Interpretation adopted in August 2020. Article 8 of the
Draft Interpretation provides that the rights holder must first submit preliminary
evidence to prove that: (a) they have implemented appropriate confidentiality
measures to protect the claimed trade secret; (b) the alleged infringer had ways or
opportunities to obtain the trade secret; and (c) that there is a “high probability” of
infringement. After the right holder sufficiently provides that evidence, article 8
requires that the burden shifts to the alleged infringer to prove one of the following
exceptions: i) there is public knowledge; ii) the non-commission of an act of
infringement; or iii) independent acquisition, such as by reverse engineering, licensing,
transfer etc. to avoid a presumption of liability.54 Commentators have puzzled over the

that the final article 5 added “commercial value” of the trade secret as an evaluation criteria.
This is indeed an important criteria to measure the degree of correspondence between the
measures adopted and the nature of the secret to be protected, which was highlighted in
point d) of article 6(3) of the Draft Interpretation. In substance the two provisions are almost
identical.
53 Id. art. 6. Article 6 of the 2020 Interpretation provides that:
If one of the following circumstances is sufficient to prevent the disclosure of
commercial secrets under normal circumstances, the people's court shall determine
that the right holder has taken corresponding confidentiality measures: 1. Sign a
confidentiality agreement or stipulate confidentiality obligations in the contract; 2.
By means of articles of association, training, rules and regulations, written
notifications, etc., requirements for confidentiality are imposed on employees,
former employees, suppliers, customers, visitors, etc. who can access and obtain
trade secrets; 3. Restricting visitors or conducting differentiated management of
production and business sites such as secret-related factories and workshops; 4.
Differentiating and managing trade secrets and their carriers by means of marking,
classifying, isolating, encrypting, sealing, and restricting the scope of persons who
can contact or obtain them; 5. Take measures to prohibit or restrict access, storage
and copying of computer equipment, electronic equipment, network equipment,
storage equipment, software, etc., that can access and obtain trade secrets; 6.
Require the resigned employee to register, return, delete, destroy the trade secrets
and their carriers that they obtained, and continue to undertake the obligation of
confidentiality; 7) Taking other reasonable confidentiality measures
54

2020 Draft Interpretation, supra note 31, art. 8. The English translation of this article states:
Where the right holder already submits preliminary evidence to prove that
corresponding confidentiality measures have been taken against the claimed trade
secret, and the alleged infringer has channels or opportunities to obtain the trade
secret, the accused infringer shall prove either the claimed trade secrets have
already been disclosed to the public or no infringement exists…. If the alleged
infringer claims that it obtained the alleged infringing information through
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requirement of “high probability” believing that it must be the same thing as
“opportunity to obtain the secret.” 55 The provision does not further define “high
probability.” Some suggest that this threshold is met by proving prima facie one of the
infringing conducts enumerated within article 9 of the AUCL.56
The author believes that article 8 of the 2020 Draft Interpretation does not conflict
with article 32 of the AUCL. The latter clearly concerns the shifting of the burden of
proof in cases against the person entrusted with the confidential secrets. On the other
hand, article 8 of the Draft Interpretation may be read as being limited to
infringements by third parties, e.g., hackers or beneficiaries of a trade secret obtained
from someone who gave it to them after breaching their duty of confidentiality to the
rights holder under article 32 of the AUCL. Although article 8 of the 2020 Draft
Interpretation refers generically to “infringer,” it may simply be referring to a thirdparty user of the trade secret. In this case, the requirements of “opportunity to obtain
the secret” and “high probability of infringement” as separate requirements makes
sense. In practice, the provision provides the right holder with the initial obligation to
shift the burden to the recipient of the stolen secret by proving that he was in contact
with the infringer (normally former employee of the right holder or a hacker) and that
there were signs that using that information would have infringed the rights holder’s
intellectual property. Although, the fact that the enumerated defenses available to the
“infringer” include licenses or transfers, etc., seems to confirm the above-mentioned
scope of this presumption. This is a rather common situation in most businesses when
an employee at one company is approached by an employee at a competitor offering
information about the competitor’s products or services.
As one last remark, the second paragraph of article 8 of the 2020 Draft
Interpretation provides examples of proof of independent/lawful acquisition of the
secret by the defendant (e.g., reverse engineering, license, transfer etc.). 57
Interestingly, it fails to mention that the defendant should also prove that these same
acquisitions were not the result of wrongdoings. In fact, a wrongful, bad faith
acquisition would, by itself, be clear proof of “high probability” of infringement. In
defense of the draft, we can state that wrongful reverse engineering is already
sanctioned by the AUCL as interpreted by article 12(2) of the binding 2007 Supreme
People’s Court Interpretation.58 This provision provides that the defense of reverse
research and development, transfer, licensing, reverse engineering, succession, etc.,
it should provide proof.
55 George W. Jordan III & Lisa Ryan, Comments Regarding the SPC’s Six (6) Draft Judicial
Interpretations
and
Guidance
5
(Am.
Bar
Assoc.,
July
17,
2020),
https://chinaipr2.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/aba-ipl-and-sil-joint-letter-to-uspto-on-china-jiguidance-final.pdf.
56 Anti-Unfair Competition Law 2019, supra, note 27, art. 9.
57 2020 Draft Interpretation, supra note 31, art. 8 (“If the alleged infringer claims that it obtained
the alleged infringing information through research and development, transfer, licensing, reverse
engineering, succession, etc., it should provide proof.”).
58 Interpretation on Law of Unfair Competition, supra note 30, art. 12 (provides that: “Reverse
Engineering referred to in the preceding paragraph means to obtain the related technical information
on the products in technical methods by way of disassembling, mapping or analyzing the products
obtained from public channels. Any party concerned that knows the business secrets of someone else
by unjustifiable method and then claims its acquisition as lawful in excuse of reverse engineering,
that claim shall not be supported.”).
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engineering does not apply to a case in which the party has knowledge of the secret
through unjustifiable means. This important provision by the Supreme People’s Court
should serve as guidance in determining whether such defenses are based on wrongful
acquisitions or not. The former should not be allowed, thus limiting the defensive
options of draft article 8 to the latter. In this context, article 8 of the 2020 Draft
Interpretation complements and expands the shift of the burden of proof foreseen by
article 32 of the AUCL.
The above-described disputes about this provision, and maybe the fact that it may
indeed provide a regime more favorable to that of article 32 of the AUCL, may have
been enough reasons for the Supreme People’s Court to delete it from the final adopted
version of the 2020 Interpretation. The issue concerning the reverse engineering
exception in the draft article 8 was so compelling that not only did the court not include
the provision in its final text but felt compelled to override any possible critic by adding
in article 14(3) of the 2020 Interpretation. Article 14(3) provides that any claim by the
accused that he had obtained the secret by reverse engineering is barred if it is proved
that he had obtained the business secret through illicit means. Article 14(1), however,
restated the principle that self-development and reverse engineering are lawful means
of acquisition of knowledge of a secret if carried out with lawful means.59
Even assuming that the draft article 8 was eventually contained in the actual
adopted version of the 2020 Interpretation, it would not have been relevant to the
implementation of China’s commitment under article 1.5(b) of Phase I Agreement. If
we indeed compare article 8 of the 2020 Draft Interpretation with article 1.5(b) of
Phase I Agreement we note that article 8 of the draft interpretation heightens the
threshold to shift the burden of proof of “public knowledge” (or secrecy/confidentiality
in the vice versa) to the alleged infringer by adding two more requirements
(“opportunity” and “High Risk”). 60 It can be safely stated that the requirement of
article 1.5(b) of Section B, Chapter I of the Phase I Agreement has not been yet
implemented and that it is an even higher threshold than that which will be
implemented via the 2020 Draft Interpretation.
In spite of the remaining uncertainties, the implementation of article 32 of the
AUCL in combination with articles 12 and 13 of the 2020 Interpretation as well as
other corollary provisions of the Interpretation has finally provided grounds for
lightening the rights holder’s burden of proof in trade secret theft cases in China.
Things can be further improved, and the implementation of the existing provisions will
likely give an indication of the direction of future improvements. For now, the new set
of provisions will likely reduce the discretion of the judges and provide more stable
parameters for their decision-making processes. These new sets of provisions and
practices will likely improve the quality of the judicial protection of trade secrets in
civil proceedings in China.

59
60

2020 Interpretation, supra note 24, art. 14.
2020 Draft Interpretation, supra note 31, art. 8.
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B. Actual Loss, Great Loss and the Threshold for Obtaining Criminal Enforcement in
China
The Phase I Agreement provides that China must eliminate the requirement of
the right holder to prove actual loss in order to access criminal enforcement.61 On the
way to such change, China is given the opportunity to keep using the current threshold
system but under the condition that it can clarify the standards of “great loss” provided
by the Criminal Law. Afterwards, China would be able to transition to a system where
access to criminal enforcement for trade secret infringements is not conditioned on
proof of losses of any kind.
Whether the second phase will happen and under what conditions is not yet
foreseeable. In this section, we concentrate on the issue of the current state of the
thresholds to accede to criminal enforcement in trade secret infringement cases. In the
conclusions to this section, we will go back briefly to the issue of the final goal of the
Phase I Agreement to have China eliminate any kind of such thresholds.
Article 219 of the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China stipulates that
only in case of a “great loss” does a trade secret theft reach the threshold for criminal
liability. 62 Also, when, aside from such great loss, the infringement has caused

Phase I Agreement, supra note 14, art. 1.7(1).
(中 人 民 共 和 国 刑 法 （ 1997 年 修 ） ) [Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China]
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 13, 1997, effective Oct. 1, 1997), art.
219, https://www.spp.gov.cn/spp/fl/201802/t20180206_364975.shtml (China) [hereinafter Criminal
Law of the PRC]. Article 219 of the Criminal law, as translated by the author, provides that:
61
62

Whoever commits any of the following acts of infringing on business secrets and
thus causes heavy losses to the obligee shall be sentenced to fixed-term
imprisonment of not more than three years or criminal detention and shall also, or
shall only, be fined; if the consequences are especially serious, he shall be sentenced
to fixed-term imprisonment of not less than three years but not more than seven
years and shall also be fined:
(1) obtaining an obligee's business secrets by stealing, luring, coercion or any other
illegitimate means;
(2) disclosing, using or allowing another to use the business secrets obtained from
the obligee by the means mentioned in the preceding paragraph; or
(3) in violation of the agreement on or against the obligee's demand for keeping
business secrets, disclosing, using or allowing another person to use the business
secrets
he
has.
Whoever obtains, uses or discloses another's business secrets, which he clearly
knows or ought to know falls under the categories of the acts listed in the preceding
paragraph, shall be deemed an offender who infringes on business secrets.
"Business secrets" as mentioned in this Article refers to technology information or
business information which is unknown to the public, can bring about economic
benefits to the obligee, is of practical use and with regard to which the obligee has
adopted
secret-keeping
measures.
"Obligee" as mentioned in this Article refers to the owner of business secrets and
the person who is permitted by the owner to use the business secrets
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“especially serious consequences,” it triggers longer jail terms.63 Neither of the terms
“great loss” and “especially serious consequences” were defined in the Criminal Law or
the 1993 AUCL.
Article 7 of the December 2004 Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court and
the Supreme People's Procuratorate on Certain Issues Concerning the Specific
Application of Law in Hearing Criminal Cases of Infringement of Intellectual Property
Rights 64 was the first provision to address the definition of the “great loss” and
“especially serious consequences” terms. 65 Article 7 provides that a loss of over
RMB500,000 (approximately 73,000 USD), is deemed a "great loss” and a loss higher
than RMB2,500,000 (approximately 361,000 USD), is defined as an “especially serious
consequence(s)” as prescribed in article 219 of the Criminal Law.66 However, none of
the provisions defined “loss” or “consequences”, making access to criminal enforcement
in trade secret cases hinge on the individual determinations by each police officer with
jurisdiction over the claims. This lack of clear standards is reflected in the very low
number of criminal trade secret cases. Statistics from China People’s Court and China
Market Supervision Administration (MSA) show that from the beginning of 2009 to
the end of 2018 there were only 176 criminal trade secret cases against almost 1,700
civil cases. 67 The data seems to prove China’s critics right. Access to criminal
enforcement for trade secret infringement is unduly difficult and the system is
recognized as weak, even by Chinese legal authors,68 given the lack of proper and clear
guidelines as to the definition of the “great loss” threshold.
The Phase I Agreement points to this specific issue as the most critical to be
tackled if China wants to provide rights holders with a balanced, consistent, and fair
Id. art. 219.
(最高人民法院、最高人民检察院关于办理侵犯知识产权刑事案件具体应用法律若干问题的解释)
[Interpretation of the Sup. People’s Ct. and the Sup. People’s Procuratorate on Several Issues
Concerning the Application of the <Law on Handling Criminal Cases of Infringement of Intellectual
Property Rights> [2004]] (promulgated by the Judicial Comm. of the Sup. People’s Ct., Dec. 8, 2004,
effective Dec. 22, 2004), art. 7, http://www.ccl.cn/zdal/front/find_by_idDetailDemos.do?id=4121152
[hereinafter Interpretation on Criminal Cases of Infringement].
65 Id. art. 7. Article 7, by way of the author’s translation, provides that:
63
64

Whoever commits any of the acts as prescribed in Article 219 of the Criminal Law,
with the amount of loss caused to the owner of the commercial secret which is more
than RMB500,000, shall be deemed to have "caused heavy losses to the commercial
secret obligee", and shall be sentenced to a fixed-term of imprisonment or criminal
detention of not more than three years for the crime of infringing commercial secret,
and/or be imposed with a pecuniary fine. 2. If the amount of losses caused to the
commercial secret obligee is more than RMB2,500,000, the person shall be deemed
to have caused "especially serious consequences" as prescribed in Article 219 of the
Criminal Law, and shall be sentenced to a fixed-term of imprisonment of not less
than three years but not more than seven years for the crime of commercial secret
infringement, and shall be concurrently imposed with a pecuniary fine.
Id. art. 7.
Laws and Regulations, PKULAW.COM, https://pkulaw.com/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2021) (data
sourced and collated from the judicial cases database of Pkulaw.com, a website owned and managed
by Chinalawinfo Co. Ltd., a company established by the Legal Information Center of Peking
University).
68 Mark Cohen, An Update on Data-Driven Reports on China’s IP Enforcement Environment,
CHINAIPR (July 13, 2020), https://chinaipr.com/category/trade-secret/.
66
67
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trade secret protection system. Defining great loss will reduce the arbitrary discretion
of the decision makers, which seems to be one of the main reasons why access to
criminal enforcement in trade secret cases is denied in China.
1. First attempts at defining Great Loss
Already in the 1993 AUCL the concept of actual loss was defined as referring to
both direct and indirect losses.69 Article 20(1) of the 1993 AUCL included, among the
actual losses, the cost to investigate the infringement of the trade secret.70 Still, more
issues remained opened at that time. The AUCL and the case law had not yet clarified
whether development costs or the value of the trade secret were included in the indirect
losses, or other costs to repair to the damage suffered, besides those for the
investigation of the infringement. An important clarification came with the 2007
Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court. Article 17 of that interpretation
stipulated that in case of infringement of a trade secret, the commercial value of the
secret shall be ascertained in light of such elements as the research and development
costs, the income from implementing this business secret, possible benefits, and the
time for maintaining the competitive advantage. 71 This provided an extremely
favorable method of calculation of losses in trade secrete cases that could have applied
also to the definition of “great loss” of article 219 Criminal Law. The provision was so
favorable that it expressly equated actual loss with the value of the trade secret.
However, this AUCL provision as interpreted by the Supreme People’s Court was
not used to interpret the foundation of the requirement of “great loss” as a threshold
of criminal liability. This is not surprising given the very strict and formal
compartmentalization of the legal and administrative system in China and the very
nature of the criminal process. The AUCL concerns civil rights and liabilities and its
employment was circumscribed to that sphere of law. Also, the police, as the initiator
of criminal enforcement in trade secret cases, have an interest in keeping the standard
vague in order to maintain discretion and the power to intervene according to its
corporative interests. Others argue that the high thresholds make criminal cases too
complex so that police and public prosecutors are discouraged by taking on such
matters, also considering how low IP crimes rank in their internal structure.72
In effect, police officers charged with determining whether a case is meritorious
of criminal enforcement must put on a lawyer hat, but they do not really have one.
Asking them to make preliminary evaluation of complex accounting evidence presents
a real challenge. They are also conscious that their work will be then scrutinized by
the public prosecutor, a jurist, before it makes it to the criminal court. This is a far
more complex process when compared to more straightforward proceedings against
trademark counterfeiters.

Law Against Unfair Competition 1993, supra note 4, art. 10(3).
Id. art. 20(1).
71 Interpretation on Criminal Cases of Infringement, supra note 64, art. 7.
72 MARTIN K. DIMITROV, PIRACY AND THE STATE: THE POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN CHINA 156 (2009).
69
70
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In all these years there was no progress until 2010. In a set of provisions issued
that year,73 the Supreme People’s Court attempted to provide a clearer definition of
great loss so as to provide a stable threshold for the commencement of criminal
enforcement. According to the 2010 Provisions, great loss is incurred if the rights
holder can prove that: (1) the violation caused a loss of over 500,000 RMB to the trade
secret holders or, in case loss cannot be proven, that illegal gains from the infringement
are over 500,000 RMB; (2) that the violation led the trade secret holders to bankruptcy;
or (3) there are other circumstances under which great losses is caused to the trade
secret holders.74
The provision, however, did not provide any hint as to whether “loss” should be
defined in accordance with the AUCL or not. This was no progress. Again, it was left
to the police, or the criminal court to make such determination on a case-by-case basis.
The addition of an alternative method for calculating the threshold of great loss, i.e.,
the illicit profit of the infringer (no. 2 above), is of limited benefit in trade secret cases
for several reasons. First, it is subordinated to the proof from the rights holder, so it
was impossible for him/her to calculate its own losses. Second, in an enforcement
system like that of China, there is no discovery, and it will be almost impossible to
obtain evidence of sold infringing products and determine the illicit profit without
accessing the accounting books of the infringer. Also, considering that it is possible
that infringers may keep flawed or inaccurate accounting books, especially underdeclaring earnings and revenues, it will be very difficult for a rights holder to provide
evidence of meeting such thresholds before having initiated infringement proceedings
and having involved a judge first to collect and preserve evidence. But if it is necessary
to go through a judge first, the purpose of having a quick police enforcement is defied.
Last but not least, it was disputed whether the cost to commit the crime should be
deducted from the revenues when calculating the illicit profit. Including the crime cost
in the calculation would further reduce the chances of reaching the stated threshold.75
To make access to criminal justice even more difficult, the Draft Provisions added
another very strict criterion: proof that the rights holder is bankrupt.76 First, it is not
clear whether this is a mandatory requirement working in conjunction with the other
threshold requirements, or if it is an alternative to the latter. A reading of the provision
would fortunately make it one of alternative circumstances rather than one that is
required in all circumstances. Second, it is not explained in the Provisions whether the
rights holder should file for bankruptcy before applying for criminal enforcement or
only provide accounting evidence of actual or imminent insolvency. It seems that the
criteria were put there with the clear purpose of making the Provisions practically
inapplicable. In sum, the provisions appeared to be appeasing the critics by providing
some more guidance as to the definition of great loss but making sure that in practice
73 (最高人民检察院公安部关于公安机关管辖的刑事案件立案追诉标准的规定(二)) (2010 年 5 月 7 日)
[Provisions on the Standards for Filing Criminal Cases Under the Jurisdiction of the Public Security
Organs for Investigation and Prosecution (II)] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Procuratorate and
Ministry of Public Security, May 7, 2010, effective May 7, 2010), art. 73,
https://wipolex.wipo.int/en/text/350755 [hereinafter 2010 Provisions].
74 Id.
75 Dong Shitong & Sheng Huanghuang, How to determine the "significant loss" in the crime of
infringing on trade secrets, XINHUANET.COM (June 25, 2019), http://www.xinhuanet.com/legal/201906/25/c_1124665586.htm.
76 2010 Provisions, supra note 73, art. 73(3).
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the provision had no effective application. Thus, the critics and political pressure from
the West kept coming.
This explains why the issue came up again with the Phase I Agreement. Article
1.7 of the Phase I Agreement provides that China will undertake to lower the
thresholds for the commencement of criminal enforcement. 77 In particular, it
stipulates that China shall allow the claimant to fulfill the “great loss” requirement
set forth by article 219 of the Criminal Law of China by including in the calculation
the remedial cost incurred by the right holder to mitigate the damage to the business
caused by the trade secret theft.78
The 2020 Interpretation did not address this issue in spite of the renewed critics
and the provisions of the Phase I Agreement. The implementation of a clearer standard
for the acceptance of criminal cases is a critical feature for the effective protection of
trade secrets in China. Only criminal liability and the certainty and consistency of
criminal punishment can deter from trade secret infringement. Civil and
administrative remedies can only partially reduce the impact of a trade secret
violation, but can hardly make it good, lacking thus a real deterring effect. As long as
criminal enforcement is left to the discretion of the acting police officer with
jurisdiction over a potential claim, all the other improvements will have a lesser
significance and a minor impact on how trade secrets are effectively protected in
China.79
2. Recent Jurisprudence and Corrective Intervention of the Supreme People’s Court in
July 2020
At the end of 2019 there were a number of criminal cases involving trade secret
theft in which both the police during the initial investigative phase, and the criminal
courts later, began applying, by analogy, some of the provisions of the AUCL we
mentioned above. In particular, they started to apply the definition of actual loss in
the AUCL to criminal cases in order to determine whether the great loss threshold for
the case acceptance had been achieved.
In the judgment issued in 2019, the Qingdao Intermediate Court in the case
Qingdao Yunlu Advanced Materials Technology Co v. Jiang80 found that the case value
could be determined by the proof provided by the plaintiff for lost license fees. The
same evidence was provided by the plaintiff to the police and the prosecutor that had
accepted it to measure the value of the case.
On September 30, 2019 the Beijing No. 1 Intermediate People’s Court, acting as
an appeal court issued a judgment in the matter Beijing Fuxing Xiaocheng Electronic
Phase I Agreement, supra note 14, art. 1.7.
Id.
79 Overall, trade secret cases amount to merely 7% of all IP cases in China in the last year. This
statistic confirms that most trade secret violations remain undetected and no complaints are filed,
especially when foreign right holders are involved, due to their lack of trust in the Chinese
enforcement system when it comes to trade secrets.
80 Crime of “Amorphous Strip” Infringement of Commercial Secrets, QDMC.GOV.CN (July, 8, 2020),
http://www.qdmc.gov.cn/gb2312/plhb/anli/20200708615.html. (It is not possible to collect more precise
data on this case because the court has not published the whole judgment and case records in order
to protect the secrets contained therein).
77
78
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Technology Co., LTD v. Wu Qinghai et Al. 81, liquidating the rights holder’s R&D cost
as indirect losses. More interestingly, the rights holder had provided the police and the
public prosecutor audit reports to prove such cost when applying for a criminal
investigation and enforcement. This means that the police had accepted this evidence
and had considered actual indirect losses as a base to prove and calculate “great loss”
under article 219 Criminal Law and accepted the case because such losses amounted
to more than the 500,000 RMB threshold indicated in the 2010 provisions of the
Supreme People’s Court.
As recently as December 2019 the Intermediate People’s Court of Huizhou, acting
as an appeal court in the case of trade secret theft by former employees of Huaxing
Ltd. 82 , expanded the definition of indirect losses when it liquidated the damage
compensation owed to the rights holder to include the cost for labor and market
intelligence to create a secret technical solution to the related production plan as part
of development cost. Like in the previous case in Beijing, the same evidence had been
filed by the rights holder with the police to prove that it had suffered a “great loss.”
The police accepted that evidence and the case.
Also, in most cases in 2019, both the police and the procurators involved in the
initial enforcement phase tended to appoint local specialized and accredited auditors
to calculate the claimed “great losses”, thus showing initiative and awareness of the
need for external technical support in determining losses.83
The above cited cases showed that in spite of the uncertainties and the higher
probatory burden of the 2010 Provisions examined in the preceding paragraphs, police
and judges still adopted more flexible approaches that appeared to extend the use of
the criteria of “actual loss” from the AUCL to the determination of “great loss” of article
219 of the Criminal Law. This speaks for an increased awareness, even at lower
administrative levels, of the need to reduce discretional assessments and increase
consistency and transparency in the decision-making process in response to external
pressure and criticism.
Aware of this evolving situation, coupled with the lack of clarity in recent case law
and China’s commitments within the Phase I Agreement, the Supreme People’s Court
issued in July 2020, a month after the 2020 Draft Interpretation, a formal document
81 (2019)京 01 刑终 329 号) [Beijing Fuxing Xiaocheng Electronic Tech. Co., Ltd. v. Wu Qinghai et
al.], (2019) Jing 01 Xing Zhong No. 329 (Beijing No. 1 Intermediate People’ Ct. 2019) (China).
82 ((2018)粤 13 刑终 361 号) [Huaxing Ltd., A Case Involving Trade Secret Theft], (2018) Yue 13
Xing Zhong No. 361 (Intermediate People’s Ct. of Huizhou 2018) (China).
83 See ((2019)京 0109 刑初 106 号) [Beijing Jingdao Co. Ltd. v. Tian X], (2019) Jing 0109 Xing Chu
No. 106 (Mentougou District Court of Beijing 2019) (China). In this case it is reported that after the
initial complaint by the victim, the police appointed Beijing Tongda Law Center for Judicial Expertise
to verify the economic loss to the rights holder. See also (商业秘密保护规定（征求意见稿）) [Provisions
on the Protection of Trade Secrets] (promulgated by the State Admin. For Market Reg., Sept. 4, 2020,
rev’d Oct. 18, 2020) (Draft for Comment), art. 22, http://www.moj.gov.cn/news/content/202009/04/zlk_3255345.html [hereinafter Provisions on Protection of Trade Secrets] (article 22 provides
for a broader set of circumstances for the parties to lawfully introduce expert opinions in trade secret
infringement cases. For example, rights holders and alleged infringers can entrust a lawfully qualified
expert to check whether the right holder’s information is known to the public. Also, expert opinions
can be introduced to comments on substantive matters such as the determination of whether the
information used by the alleged infringer is substantially similar to the information of the right
holder, etc. The Market Supervision and Management Department, the agency in charge of
administrative enforcement will have the final decision on whether to admit and how to evaluate the
probatory value of each expert opinions.).
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we have already called the 2020 Provisions84 in which the court, coming back to the
criteria listed in the 2010 Provision, revisits them, including the softening of the
bankruptcy requirement at point 3 of the 2010 Provisions. The July 2020 Provisions
stipulate that the rights holder must prove that the violation of its trade secrets has
either caused bankruptcy (like already provided back in 2010) or a shut down due to
business difficulties.85
More importantly, the same document finally deals directly with the issue of how
to determine the threshold of “great loss” in article 219 of the Criminal Law. In
particular, according to this very recent draft of the Supreme People’s Court, the
amount of loss or illicit profit as originally specified in the 2010 Provisions may be
determined in the following manners:86
(1) If the rights holder's trade secret was obtained by improper means and has not
been disclosed, used or allowed to be used by others, the amount of loss can be
determined according to the reasonable license fee for the trade secret. This seems to
cover the case of a hacker or a third party or competitor that illicitly acquires the trade
secret. Given that there was no use, the loss is equaled to the revenues that could have
been generated if the secret had been lawfully licensed.
(2) In case of disclosing, using or allowing others to use the trade secrets which
were obtained by unfair means, the amount of loss can be determined according to the
rights holder’s loss of sales profits caused by the infringement. In case the foresaid loss
of sales profits is lower than the trade secret’s reasonable license fee, the loss of the
right holder could be determined according to the reasonable license fee of the trade
secret. This case is similar to the one before, with the major difference that there is use
of the misappropriated secret. Like before, there is no breach of a direct confidentiality
stipulation. Both the hypothetical license fees or the loss of sales profit are to be used
to determine whether the 500,000 RMB threshold has been reached or not.
(3) In case of disclosing, using or allowing others to use the trade secrets in their
possession in violation of the agreement or the rights holder’s requirements for keeping
trade secrets, the amount of loss can be determined according to the loss of sales profits
suffered by the right holder caused by the infringement.
(4) If the trade secret is known to have been obtained by improper means, or by
violating the agreement or the rights holder’s request to keep or disclose the trade
secret, the amount of loss suffered by the rights holder could be determined in
accordance with the loss of sales profits of the rights holder due to the infringement.
(5) Property or other property benefits obtained by disclosing or allowing others
to use trade secrets shall be deemed as illegal income.
All of the above provisions seem to limit the calculation of “loss” to direct losses in
the traditional sense, i.e., loss of profit. The Court then goes on to specify that the loss
of sales profits of the rights holder resulting from the infringement as specified at
numbers 2), 3) and 4), may be determined based on the total amount of reduction in
the rights holder’s sales volume caused by the infringement multiplied by the
reasonable profit of each product of the rights holder.87 If the total amount of reduction
in sales volume cannot be determined, the loss of sales profits can be determined by
2020 Provisions, supra note 25.
Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
84
85
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multiplying the sales volume of infringing products by the reasonable profit of each
product of the rights holder. 88 If the amount of loss of the right holder cannot be
determined, it can be determined by multiplying the sales volume of the infringing
product by the reasonable profit of each infringing product.89 It is evident that the
Court has applied here the provisions applicable to patent infringements.
However, the same Provisions add a corrective: if the trade secret has been
disclosed to the public or destroyed due to the infringement, the amount of loss may be
determined according to the commercial value of the trade secret.90 The commercial
value of a trade secret can be determined by comprehensively considering factors such
as research and development costs and the benefits of implementing the trade secret.91
Also, the expenses incurred in the adoption of remedial measures by the rights holder
to reduce the direct commercial loss caused by the infringement, or the security
measures taken to restore the safety of the computer information system, shall be
included in the rights holder’s loss.92 This provision applies to all cases of trade secret
infringement.
Therefore, the criteria to determine the threshold to prove “great loss” and thus
accede to criminal enforcement in cases of trade secret infringement in China
according to the latest thinking of the Supreme People’s Court can be summed up as
follows: a) if the trade secret is stolen but not lost, the loss is determined by the lost
profit caused by that infringement (direct loss only) plus recovery and remedial
measures (limited indirect loss); or b) if the trade secret has been lost and publicly
disclosed or destroyed, the loss is determined by direct and full indirect losses
altogether.
With these Provisions the Supreme People’s Court has provided a more reliable
and clearer standard to separate severe infringements from less serious ones. In
particular, it draws a line between types of trade secret infringement violations. On
one side are the cases where the trade secret has not been lost or divulged to the public
and on the other, the more severe infringement cases where the trade secret is
destroyed or lost by now being in the public knowledge. For the less severe
infringements, the loss required to be proved to access criminal enforcement is based
on loss of profit. This will require the right holder to prove very high losses in order to
trigger criminal liabilities. This should redirect cases with lower economic value to civil
or administrative enforcement avenues. However, if the trade secret is destroyed, and
is no longer usable, or made public and therefore everybody can now use it with
impunity, which is held equal to being destroyed, then the right holder is given the
right to include full indirect losses into the calculation of the threshold in order to
initiate criminal enforcement. Unlike patents, a lost trade secret is no longer
exclusively enjoyable and therefore, the mere loss of profit would not suffice to cover
its real losses, which is the overall commercial value of the secret including research
and development and labor cost. In practice, in these more severe cases, it should be

Id.
2020 Provisions, supra note 25.
90 Id.
91 2020 Draft Interpretation, supra note 31, art. 19. This interpretation of “commercial value” is
now embodied in art. 19 of the 2020 Interpretation in relation to civil claims.
92 2020 Provisions, supra note 25.
88
89
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easier for the right holder to prove the required 500,000 RMB great loss and access
criminal justice.
With these Provisions the Supreme People’s Court attempts to balance the
economic interests of the rights holders with the economy of the justice system in
China, by requiring that only meritorious cases deserve criminal enforcement, while
preserving a certain flexibility in determining such merit in a fair manner. This does
apparently address the requirement of the Phase I Agreement by finally providing a
definition of “great loss.” Whether this will lead to an increase in the number of
criminal cases, especially those involving foreign elements, remains to be seen. In spite
of the guidance, uncertainties about the provision remain. First of all, the definition of
“known to the public,” which is required to claim indirect losses to determine whether
the threshold of “great loss” is met, is not better defined. Would that include the case
where the secret is available in a freely marketed product that can also be reverse
engineered by anybody? What about the case in which the stolen secret is licensed or
transferred to a third party in good faith? Had article 8 of the Draft Interpretation
been confirmed in the final adopted version of the 2020 Interpretation, there may also
have been conflict with this provision. For example, article 8 of the 2020 Draft
Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court made reverse engineering, licensing, or
other contractual acquisitions of trade secrets lawful and not susceptible to liability for
trade secret infringement.93 That provision did not specify whether such exceptions are
void when the secret which is the object of such transactions are acquired illegally.
This may be another reason why article 8 of the 2020 Draft Interpretation was deleted
from the final text.
Considering that the Court already used by analogy the Patent Law to determine
the “great loss” threshold, it seems logical that the same law and regulations could be
used to interpret the terms “known to the public.” The 2010 Patent Examination
Guidelines can provide guidance. In case the secret is published in commercial
brochures, exhibition materials, photos on websites, technical articles, product
descriptions, the presumption that it is known to the public is absolute.94 Anybody can
potentially read those publications. In the case of the use of trade secrets, the
disclosure to the public can occur by making, selling, using, importing, exchanging,
presenting, demonstrating, exhibiting, and making other similar uses.95 Speculations
about how to interpret “known to the public” ended however in August 2020 with the
adoption of the final text of the 2020 Interpretation that can be safely used to interpret
also the 2020 Provisions. Article 4 of the 2020 Interpretation, which was not initially
included in the 2020 Draft Interpretation provides a clearer definition of “known to the
public.”96 This new provision provides that information is known to the public when
(1) The information belongs to common sense or industry practice in the field; (2) The
information only involves the size, structure, material, simple combination of
components, etc., and can be obtained directly by relevant personnel in the field by
observing the listed products; (3) The information has been publicly disclosed in public
publications or other media; (4) The information has been disclosed through public
2020 Draft Interpretation, supra note 31, art. 8.
China National Intellectual Property Administration, Guidelines for Patent Examination pt.
II, ch. 3, art. 2.1.2.1 (2010), http://www.gechengip.com/information/gfpe2010_en.htm.
95 Id. pt. II, ch. 3, art. 2.1.2.2.
96 2020 Interpretation, supra note 24, art. 4.
93
94
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reports, exhibitions, etc.; (5) Relevant persons in the field can obtain the information
from other public channels. Also, article 14(3) of the 2020 Interpretation excludes the
case in which knowledge is obtained through illegal actions and wrongdoings, such as
reverse engineering on secrets illegally obtained.97
Another issue that will need clarification is whether the requirement of
bankruptcy or shutting down the company as a consequence of the loss of the trade
secret is in addition to or alternative to great loss. In the author’s view, it should be
the second case. Adding such a requirement to the already complex proof of great loss
would greatly limit access to criminal enforcement and defy the efforts of defining
“great loss.” Many businesses may lose a trade secret, have great losses, but not be
bankrupt or shut down. The bankruptcy or shut down of a whole production line should
not be a requirement as a way to prove the “destruction” and complete loss of the trade
secret. For this reason, it will hopefully be read as an alternative presumption to prove
great loss. A company that goes bankrupt because of a trade secret loss can indeed be
presumed to have suffered a great loss. Again, we will need to see how judges will apply
this provision once finally adopted.
In conclusion we can make two remarks. First of all, we can state that with the
draft 2020 Provisions the Supreme People’s Court has attempted to fulfill China’s
obligations from the Phase I Agreement. The Supreme People’s Court has now
provided a reliable and fair method to calculate great loss thus reducing the discretion
possessed by police, prosecutors, and criminal judges when accepting trade secret
complaints.
Whether and when China will move to the final phase of eliminating the
requirement to prove a loss in order to accede to criminal enforcement remains
uncertain. The author believes that such a change will not come any time soon; or if it
will ever come at all. First of all, the Phase I Agreement does not pose any deadline.
Even the fulfillment of the first step (clarification of the threshold of “great loss”) had
no deadline. The fact that China, through the Supreme People’s Court promptly
reacted by issuing regulations to fulfill that commitment, does not mean that they will
be so quick in fulfilling the second step. There are reasons to think so. First of all,
China had an immediate interest to appease the U.S. and reduce the political pressure,
while at the same time ensuring better reciprocal treatment for its businesses abroad.
Defining “great loss” was just a step away, given the trend of the 2019 case law and
the AUCL amendments. The clarification also better rationalized the distribution of
cases providing a more efficient way for the judicial and police branches to manage
cases. China in sum had a direct and immediate interest in doing that change.
However, we do not see any such interest in opening access to criminal
enforcement to all cases by removing the proof of loss as a gate keeper. This would
require a complete reform of the administrative and criminal enforcement of IP rights
in China. In the actual system, criminal cases are reserved for complex infringements,
while smaller cases of infringement are to be enforced through administrative
proceedings. Allowing criminal enforcement in all cases would not only alter the
balance with the parallel administrative enforcement procedures but would require a
more fundamental change to the current structure of criminal prosecution in China.

97

2020 Interpretation, supra note 24, art. 14(3).
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Unlike the US, China utilizes an inquisitorial criminal model, 98 where action is
initiated at the discretion of the Public Security Bureau (the police). Also, China does
not adopt the principle of mandatory criminal prosecution (like in Italy for instance),
leaving to the prosecuting bodies room for some discretion as to the initiation of a
criminal investigation. Although a reform of the criminal prosecution of trade secret
cases is surely desirable, it would have to be undertaken in a way as to include all IP
rights and not only trade secrets..
I also do not see why the U.S. would want such a change. Eliminating the
threshold will simply move the clock backward to a system where mere discretion is
the sole parameter for case selection. Eliminating the “great loss” threshold could in
the end result in the return of politically driven choices by the enforcers that will be
bound by no criteria to determine which case deserves criminal enforcement. A radical
elimination of the “great loss” threshold would risk reducing the trade secret
enforcement mechanism to a boomerang. It may work in the U.S., but it does not work
in China.
Finally, China’s monetary threshold to access criminal enforcement that the
injured prove that they had a loss of about US$65,000. This threshold is not high. It is
fairly low. What was missing before was the way to measure it and therefore the police
and judges had discretion in calculating it. Now, with the proposed change in the 2020
Draft Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court, we have a fair and reliable tool to
make that evaluation and quite frankly, most cases involving foreign companies will
meet the threshold easily. If we eliminated this and we told the police to accept every
case, the police will do that but will use an arbitrary form of discretion in deciding
whether to pass the case to a prosecutor. They will likely close most of the files for fear
that the case does not present enough severity to pass the scrutiny of the public
prosecutor.
China has taken a great step forward with the 2020 Interpretation and 2020
Provisions and for now that should suffice. We should test it and see how it will work
out in practice before considering whether to push China to take the final step of
eliminating the loss threshold.
C. Trade Secret Abuses and Theft by Public Officials During Formal Administrative or
Judicial Proceedings
The U.S. is not the only nation to complain about opaque administrative practices
in China regarding the requirement of foreign rights holders to disclose confidential
business information in order to obtain licensing or authorization to conduct business

98 Mike P.H. Chu, Criminal Procedure Reform in the People’s Republic of China: The Dilemma of
Crime Control and Regime Legitimacy, 18(2) Pac. Basin L.J. 157, 159 (2000). In contrasting the
inquisitorial and adversarial criminal justice systems, the authors states: “The inquisitorial system
involves the state vigorously pursuing the facts and serving as the investigator. The state under this
circumstance is the prosecutor who collects the facts, as well as the independent and impartial judge
who is actively involved with the investigations and fact-findings.” The Inquisitorial criminal justice
systems are generally identified with the civil law tradition (although with exceptions like Italy), while
the adversarial system, known also as the accusatory system, is generally associated with the common
law tradition.
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in China. The EU has formally complained about such practices of hidden trade secret
theft and forced IP transfer in its 2020 Report on IP protection in third countries.99
There are no specific provisions in the Interpretation addressing the issues raised
by article 1.9 of the Phase I Agreement. This is not surprising because the
interpretation only addresses judicial litigation of trade secrets disputes. Such an
interpretation would not be the right tool to regulate, for instance, the liability of
government officials involved in joint venture approval proceedings, or those involved
in import license or product homologation proceedings. However, the draft could have
at least addressed the judicial liability in mishandling or violating confidential trade
secrets disclosed for litigation purposes.
Article 21 of the Interpretation addresses the specific issue in which the trade
secret information and evidence filed in a trade secret infringement proceeding, which
has been classified as confidential, is illicitly leaked by one the litigating parties. In
particular, article 21 provides that, if the parties or a third party apply in writing to
the People’s Court to take confidential measures to protect evidence and materials
involving the trade secrets of the parties or outsiders, the People's Court shall take the
necessary confidentiality measures during the litigation activities, for instance, in
evidence exchange, cross-examination, and court trial.100 If one of the parties violates
the stipulated confidentiality measures and discloses trade secrets or uses them
outside of litigation activities or allows others to use the trade secrets obtained in the
litigation, that party shall bear tort and possibly, criminal liability.101 It is remarkable
to see that no specific liability is foreseen in case the leak comes from the judge or any
court employee involved in the case. The issue of court liabilities already emerged in
relation to certain provisions drafted by the Supreme People’s Court in April 2020
regarding the disclosure of experimental data in administrative court proceedings
concerning the invalidation and reexamination of pharmaceutical patents, raising
doubt about the limits and risk related to the courts’ handling of highly confidential
documents in sensitive litigation.102 In sum, for now, this is another missed chance to
further implement provisions of the Phase I Agreement and to improve the
transparency of the judicial proceedings in China. We will need to wait for the
legislative intervention or for more court interpretations, likely in the area of the law
of administrative proceedings to see if article 1.9 of the Phase I Agreement will be fully
implemented by the Chinese side.
D. Preliminary Relief
Article 1.6 of Chapter I, Section B of the Phase I Agreement requires China to
provide prompt and effective measures to prevent the use of misappropriated trade
99 European Commission, Report on the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property
Rights in Third Countries 18 (Staff Working Document (2019) 452 final/2, Aug. 1, 2020),
https://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2020/january/tradoc_158561.pdf.
100 2020 Interpretation, supra note 24, art. 21.
101 Id.
102 Paolo Beconcini, The Chinese Supreme People’s Court Intervenes on Patent Issues, with Focus
on
Pharmaceutical
Experiments,
NAT’L
L.
REV.
(May
22,
2020),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/chinese-supreme-people-s-court-intervenes-patent-issuesfocus-pharmaceutical.
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secrets. 103 In particular, China must provide that use or attempted use of
misappropriated secrets fulfills the “urgency” requirement for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction by a court, based on the specific facts and circumstances of each
case.104 The 2019 amendment to the AUCL did not add any provision on preliminary
injunctive relief or stoppage of acts of infringement of trade secrets. However, trade
secrets are now listed among the constitutionally granted civil rights in the latest
amendment of the General Principles of Civil Law, and as such they enjoy the same
remedies of any other IP rights.105 Therefore, the Supreme People’s Court Provisions
on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in Examining Cases Involving
Act Preservation in Intellectual Property Disputes of December 2018 are applicable to
trade secrets as well. 106 This is clear from article 6 of the 2018 Provisions that
stipulates the following:
If, under any of the following situations, failure to take immediate act
preservation measures is serious enough to harm the applicant's
interests, such situation shall be considered to be the ‘urgent situation’
as mentioned in Article 100 or 101 of the Civil Procedure Law: 1. trade
secrets of the applicant are to be illegally disclosed.107
Article 101 of the Civil Procedure in particular provides for pre-litigation acts of
preservation:
Where an interested party whose legitimate rights and interests, due
to an emergency, would suffer irreparable damage if the party fails to
petition for property preservation promptly, may, before instituting a
lawsuit or applying for arbitration, apply to the people's court at the
locality of the property, the domicile of the party on which the
application is made, or the people's court with jurisdiction over the
case, for the property preservation measures. The applicant shall
provide security for such application; where the party fails to provide
such security, the court shall reject the application.108
To maintain these measures the applicant will have to file a lawsuit within 30 days.
Article 15 of the 2020 Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court takes on
article 6 of the 2018 Interpretation and slightly expands its scope. The new provision
Phase I Agreement, supra note 14, art. 1.6.
Id.
105 General Provisions of the Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the
Twlefth Nat’l People’s Cong., March 15, 2017, effective October 1, 2017), ch. V, art. 123,
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/lawsoftheprc/202001/c983fc8d3782438fa775a9d67d6e82d8.shtml
[hereinafter General Provisions of the Civil Law].
106 Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law
in the Review of Act Preservation in Intellectual Property Disputes, Judicial Interpretation No. 21
[2018] (promulgated by the Judicial Comm. of the Sup. People’s Ct. Nov. 26, 2018, effective Jan. 1,
2019), http://www.lindapatent.com/en/law_patent/803.html.
107 Id. art. 6.
108 Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l
People’s
Cong.,
April
9,
1991,
amended
June
27,
2017),
art.
101,
http://cicc.court.gov.cn/html/1/219/199/200/644.html [hereinafter Civil Procedure Law 2017].
103
104
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allows trade secret rights holders to file a request with the civil court for a preliminary
protective measure (including an order to do or not to do something or to stop, refrain
to do something) if the alleged infringer is trying to or has already disclosed, used, or
allowed others to use the alleged trade secret and if failure to take such measures
would make it difficult to enforce the judgement or result in other losses to the rightholder.109 The rights holder must post a bond as guarantee that his request is made in
good faith.110 The court will then have to make a decision on the request within 48
hours of its submission. The circumstances specified in the preceding paragraph belong
to the circumstances stated in articles 100 and 101 of the Civil Procedure Law.111
So overall, China had already started implementing provisions for preliminary
measures to protect rights holders from the dissemination and publication of stolen
trade secrets. Article 15 of the 2020 Interpretation seems to fulfill China’s obligations
under the Phase I Agreement.
Does this mean that Chinese courts will more liberally grant requests for
preliminary injunctions? Although Chinese courts have been traditionally reluctant to
grant preliminary injunctions (although in Chinese the expression is translatable in
action or behavioral preservations rather than preliminary injunctions) due to a
number of reasons (fear to take on earlier responsibility, trials in China being faster
than in other countries) the odds of getting such injunctions may increase compared to
the past. We will need to monitor this issue and come back to it in a year to see whether
the mentioned provisions have really brought about a concrete change to this disputed
issue.
VII. OTHER IMPORTANT PROVISIONS IN THE DRAFT INTERPRETATION
Although the 2020 Draft Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court has not
fully addressed all of the U.S.’s government’s grievances in the Phase I Agreement, the
draft does contain a number of positive improvements to the interpretation and
application of the provisions of article 9 of the Unfair Competition Law on the
protection of trade secrets.
For example, article 7 of the 2020 Interpretation further defines the requirement
of article 9(4) of the Unfair Competition Law, clarifying that the secret has to have
“commercial value” intended as the real or potential market value that can bring about
2020 Interpretation, supra note 24, art. 15.
Id.
111 Civil Procedure Law 2017, supra note 108, art. 101. This article in particular provides for prelitigation acts of preservation, stating that:
109
110

Where an interested party whose legitimate rights and interests, due to an
emergency, would suffer irreparable damage if the party fails to petition for
property preservation promptly, may, before instituting a lawsuit or applying for
arbitration, apply to the people's court at the locality of the property, the domicile
of the party on which the application is made, or the people's court with jurisdiction
over the case, for the property preservation measures. The applicant shall provide
security for such application; where the party fails to provide such security, the
court shall reject the application.
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a competitive advantage to its holder.112 This replaces the less favorable and stricter
requirement of the 1993 AUCL that a trade secret had to bring economic benefit.113
Article 1 of the Interpretation lists the kinds of materials that can form technical
and commercial secrets.114 The 2020 Draft Interpretation contained an article 5 that
has been deleted from the final text of the adopted 2020 Interpretation. This article 5
of the Draft Interpretation contained further stipulations about the type of commercial
secrets that qualify for legal protection.115 The first paragraph of this article provided
that only customer information resulting from a sorting and processing of data such as
the name, address, contact information, trading habits, transaction content, and
specific needs of specific customers may constitute business information referred to in
paragraph 4 of article 9 of the Anti-Unfair Competition Law. The provision echoed the
Supreme People’s Court decision in Da Keer back in December 2019.116 If confirmed in
the final adopted text of the Interpretation, the second paragraph of article 5 would
have excluded from the scope of trade secret protection contracts, invoices, and
vouchers with specific customer information or claims that the claimant has
maintained a long-term transactional relationship with a specific customer. 117 The
2020 Interpretation, supra note 24, art. 7:
Law Against Unfair Competition 1993, supra note 4, art. 10(3). In reality, the requirement of
the 1993 AUCL had already been changed by the Supreme People’s Court Interpretation of 2007,
whereby in its Art. 10 it provided that information that has practical or potential commercial value
and can be used to bring a commercial advantage to the right holder fulfills the requirement of Art.
10(3) of the AUCL in that it provides an economic benefit.
114 2020 Interpretation, supra note 24, art. 1. Article 1 provides that:
112
113

Information related to technology such as structures, raw materials, components,
formulas, materials, samples, styles, propagation materials of new plant varieties,
processes, methods or steps, algorithms, data, computer programs and related
documents can be determined to constitute the technical information referred to in
Article 9 Paragraph 4 of the Anti-Unfair Competition Law.
The People’s courts may determine that information related to business activities,
such as creativity, management, sales, finance, plans, samples, bidding materials,
customer information, and data, constitutes the business information referred to in
paragraph 4 of Article 9 of the Anti-Unfair Competition Law.
See Anti-Unfair Competition Law 2019, supra, note 27, art. 9(4) (enumerating the kinds of materials
that can form technical and commercial trade secrets: Information relating to science and technology
such as structure, raw materials, components, formulations, materials, styles, processes, methods or
their steps, algorithms, data, computer programs and relevant documents may constitute the
technical information referred to in paragraph 4 of Article 9 of the Anti-Unfair Competition Law.
Creative ideas, management, marketing, finance, plans, samples, bidding materials, data and
customer information related to business activities may constitute the business information referred
to in paragraph 4 of Article 9 of the Anti-Unfair Competition Law.).
115 2020 Draft Interpretation, supra note 31, art. 5.
116 (麦达可尔（天津）科技有限公司、华某 1 兴科技（天津）集团有限公司侵害商业秘密纠纷再审民
事 判 决 书 (2019) 最 高 法 民 再 268 号 ) [Mai Da Keer (Tianjin) Tech. Co., Ltd. v. Huayang Xinxing
Technology (Tianjin) Group Co., Ltd., Civil Judgment for Retrial of Trade Secret Infringement
Dispute], (2019) Sup. Fa Min Zai No. 268 (Sup. People’s Ct. 2019) (China),
http://tonghanggongsi.com/Case/detail/id/3473.html.
117 Provisions on Protection of Trade Secrets, supra note 83, art. 5. These draft provisions
provided a broader scope of examples of commercial/operative secrets compared to the Draft
Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court. Article 5(3) of these provisions reads:
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latter portion of this article 5 of the Draft Interpretation has now been incorporated in
article 2(1) of the 2020 Interpretation, while the first paragraph has been reproduced
in Article 1(3) of the 2020 Interpretation without reference to “information formed after
sorting and processing.” This seems to simplify the admissibility of evidence, reducing
the level of elaboration of the same, that was not further defined in article 5 of the
draft, and leaving to the judges of the specific case to weigh each piece of evidence
according to the case circumstances.
Article 10 of the draft interpretation provides a gap filler in cases where
confidentiality obligations do not derive from the law or a contract, recognizing that
such obligations can be reconstructed from the principle of good faith, from the purpose
of the contract and its negotiation, or the local business habits and customs that the
alleged infringer knew or should have known given the circumstances.118
Article 16 provides that where other natural persons, legal persons, and
unincorporated organizations other than business operators infringe on trade secrets,
and the right holder claims the civil liability of the infringer in accordance with article
17 of the Anti-Unfair Competition Law, the People's court shall support it. 119
Interestingly, the original draft version of the second paragraph of this article also
provided that where an employee or ex-employee breaches a confidentiality agreement
and infringes on the trade secret of the right holder, the rights holder is allowed to
“choose to assert liability for breach of contract or liability for tort according to law.”120
The provision was not well formulated and could have caused an undue burden to right
holders. While, in most western jurisdictions a plaintiff would be able to assert both
claims in the same lawsuit, in China the claimant would have to file two separate
lawsuits for each cause of action. But was this provision imposing the election of a
cause of action to the exclusion of another? Nonetheless, the Court decided to cut that
short and delete this second paragraph from the final text.
Another few articles in the 2020 Interpretation address procedural issues. This is
the case of the articles dealing with the coordination between criminal and civil
proceedings running parallel for the same violation. For instances, these articles allow
for the retrieval of evidence from the parallel criminal proceedings (article 22(2)) and
for the stay of the civil proceedings (article 25).121
Article 24 provides that after the right holder has proved that the infringer is
benefiting from the infringement but cannot access the infringer’s accounting books
and data related to the infringement of trade secrets, the people’s court may order the
infringer to disclose the accounting books and information. If the infringer refuses to
provide it without justifiable reasons or does not provide it truthfully, the People's
court may determine the benefits obtained by the infringer from the infringement
The operating information in these regulations refers to all kinds of information
related to the business activities of the right holder, including but not limited to
management know-how, customer lists, employee information, supply information,
production and marketing strategies, financial data, inventory data, strategic
planning, purchase prices, Information such as profit model, base price in bidding
and content of tender documents.
2020 Draft Interpretation, supra note 31, art. 10.
Id. art. 16.
120 Id. art. 16(2).
121 2020 Interpretation, supra note 24, art. 22(2) & 25.
118
119
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based on the claims and evidence provided by the right holder.122 This grants trade
secrets the same amount of discovery protection that has been previously granted to
trademarks, patents, and copyrights.
Article 27 of the draft requires the rights holder to include the specific alleged
trade secret as well as evidence of measures it has taken to protect confidentiality.123
This provision is in line with the general judicial trend of improving and increasing
the use of preliminary reliefs in IP disputes.124
The 2020 Draft Interpretation did provide a definition of commercial value of
trade secrets. Defining commercial value is critical for the determination of the validity
of a “trade secret” claim.125 As discussed in Section B of this article, a definition of
commercial value previously had to be extrapolated from different statutory provisions
and court interpretations. The 2020 Interpretation, aware of the regulatory gap and in
coordination with the 2020 Provisions on the definition of “great loss” as threshold for
the determination of criminal liability, provides now a definition of “commercial value.”
Article 19 of the 2020 Interpretation provides that: 1) commercial value shall be
considered by the court when deciding the compensation for the infringement of a trade
secret that is disclosed to the public; 2) that when determining the commercial value
of such trade secret the people's court shall consider factors such as the cost of research
and development, the benefits of implementing the trade secret, the available benefits,
and the time span needed by the right holder to maintaining a competitive
advantage.126
In regard to damage compensation, the 2020 Draft Interpretation contained a
draft article 24 concerning the apportionment of the value of a trade secret as part of
a whole technical solution. 127 The draft article 24 provided that if the technical
information belongs to part of a technical solution or the product that infringes the
trade secrets is a part of another product, the damages should be determined based on
the proportion and role of the involved technical information within the entire
technical solution. Alternatively, damages should consist of the value of the infringing
products and the proportion and role of the infringing products in the profit of the
entire finished products. If the trade secret is business information, the amount of
compensation for infringement shall be reasonably determined based on factors such
as the effect of the business information on the profits obtained from the act of
infringing trade secrets. Interestingly, this provision was not embodied in the final text
of the Interpretation.
Id. art. 24
Id. art. 27.
124 Supreme People's Court Previews Judicial Interpretation of Trade Secret Protection
Provisions for Public Comment, LEXOLOGY (June 22, 2020),
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=c1fe8d41-9d1e-4056-8f33-7dddbb902482 (“On
December 14, 2018, the SPC issued a set of judicial interpretations for preliminary injunctions in IP
and competition cases. Notably, Chinese law allows a right holder to request a preliminary
injunction either before or after the filing of a complaint.”).
125 Anti-Unfair Competition Law 2019, supra note 27, art. 9(4). Article 9(4) of the AUCL
provides that: “For the purpose of this Law, commercial secrets refer to any technical information,
operational information or commercial information which is not known to the public and has
commercial value, and for which its obligee has adopted measures to ensure its confidentiality.”
(emphasis added).
126 2020 Interpretation, supra note 24, art. 19.
127 2020 Draft Interpretation, supra note 31, art. 24.
122
123
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VIII. CONCLUSIONS
Statistics from China People’s Court and China Market Supervision
Administration (MSA) show that from the beginning of 2019 to July 2020, there have
been 405 recorded trade secret cases in China. This shows an increase of about 50% on
an annual basis compared to the number of cases filed between 2009 and 2018 which
amounted to a total of 1,848. However, of these 405 cases, only four were criminal
cases. This shows that, in spite of the very large increase in cases filed, only 1% of them
are criminal cases, while the majority are civil cases.128 Based on these very basic
statistics, we can say that access to criminal enforcement in trade secret theft matters
has remained a chimera for most rights holders. Clarifying and lowering the thresholds
for access to criminal enforcement will be the best way to ensure more effective
protection to rights holders.
However, in 2019 there were 41 criminal cases concerning the theft of trade
secrets and 9 cases through June 2020. 129 This shows that things have started
changing. The AUCL amendment in 2019 has indeed opened the floodgates. The case
law we briefly examined above shows that police, procurators, and judges have taken
the initiative to engineer better and more efficient ways to help rights holders gain
access to criminal enforcement.
The recent interventions of the Supreme People’s Court, together with the AUCL
amendment of 2019, seem to provide hope for a further increase in the number of
criminal cases. The extension and the reinforcement of what constitutes protectable
secrets, the expansion of the definition of infringers to include hackers and cyber
thieves, the harsher liabilities and punishment of third parties wrongly obtaining the
stolen secret, along with the provisions lightening the burden of proof of the rights
holder, and eventually the lowering and clarification of the thresholds to obtain
criminal enforcement, seem to be all very favorable to rights holders and satisfy, to a
substantial extent, the commitments China has taken with the Phase I Agreement.
We can safely state that there was no better time than this one to enforce trade secrets
in China. All things considered, and in spite of the remaining doubts on how such
changes will really be implemented by the courts, especially when foreign elements are
involved, China has at least in part, responded to its critics and taken swift and
concrete action to meet expectations.
However, discussions between China and the U.S., and the latter’s grievances,
will likely continue for the foreseeable future as one of the most critical issues
remained unaddressed in spite of the hyperactivity of the Chinese Supreme People’s
Court: that of the forced disclosure and transfer of trade secrets and technology by
pressuring foreign companies into joint venture with local competitors, restricting
technology licensing terms, and by illicit practices of public officials in administrative
128 The article has refrained from providing statistics for administrative enforcement because
administrative punishment decisions are presented in the official website of each involved Market
Supervision Administration (MSA), which would require a very extensive and time-consuming
compiling work, because there is no centralized database to include all these administrative decisions.
Also, many decisions issued before 2015 are not available online.
129 Laws and Regulations, PKULAW.COM, https://pkulaw.com/ (last accessed Jan. 14, 2021) (data
sourced and collated from the judicial cases database of Pkulaw.com, a website owned and managed
by Chinalawinfo Co. Ltd., a company established by the Legal Information Center of Peking
University).
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proceedings for the approval of licenses, homologations, import permits. Such
practices, in tandem with policies exclusively subsidizing Chinese businesses and their
intellectual property, affect foreign businesses’ market access and does not afford them
a level playing field with Chinese competitors. China is acknowledging this issue and
has taken specific commitments on forced technology transfer both in the Phase I
Agreement and more recently in the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on
Investments (CAI).
However, a drastic change of direction on these issues is not imaginable any time
soon. Meeting such commitments will require China to implement complex reforms
involving the overlapping and unclear jurisdiction of different administrations,
redefine the role, and further reform the structure of State-Owned Enterprises
(“SOE’s”) in order to concretely promote and create equal market access, while
safeguarding SOE’s competitiveness in a more open and fairly regulated market. 130 In
a recent speech at the 25th Collective Study of the Political Bureau of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party at the end of November 2020, General Secretary
Xi Jinping stressed two important guiding principles for the next reform of intellectual
property with Chinese characteristics: 1) Intellectual property is subordinate and
functional to China’s achievement of independent innovation; 2) that in this function,
China needs to switch from quantitative to qualitative IP production.131 From this
speech it is evident that the above enumerated commitments China has taken, will be
implemented in a form and at a pace that will suite the current innovation and
economic development policies of the country.
In areas of common interests, we can expect quick changes. A recent example is
the circular issued by the China Intellectual Property Administration phasing out
patent filing subsidies to local Chinese enterprises with the goal of switching from a
quantitative policy of patent filings (the Great Wall of patents) to a more quality
oriented one. 132 Eliminating incentives should help reducing junk filings of utility
patents and designs merely embodying prior art and filed with the sole purpose of
capturing subsidies and tax rebates. Another possible area where interests align is
that concerning the stepping up of anti-counterfeiting enforcement. Xi Jinping’s call to
crack down on counterfeiters by stepping up criminal enforcement is functional to his
restructuring and modernization of the supply chain to serve its Dual Circulation

130 See Anonymous, The Longer Telegram: Toward a new American China Strategy, ATLANTIC
COUNCIL, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/atlantic-council-strategy-paper-series/thelonger-telegram/ (last visited Feb. 15, 2021); ELIZABETH C. ECONOMY, THE THIRD REVOLUTION: XI
JINPING AND THE NEW CHINESE STATE 108–115 (Oxford Publ’g 2019). In spite of Xi Jinping and the
CPC external profession of deepening opening-up reform, the reality of China’s return to a more
leftist, Marxist-Leninist ideological tendencies, seems reflected in the policy of consolidating state
control over SOE’s and to bolster their strategic preeminence in order for China to acquire a
dominant market position in key sectors and to propel China towards technological independence,
while at the same time capping expectations and lowering the tolerance threshold for successful and
independent privately owned enterprises.
131 Xi Jinping’s Speech at the 25th Study Session of the Political Bureau of the Central
Committee, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY (Dec. 1, 2020), http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/202012/01/content_5566183.htm.
132 关于进一步严格规范专利申请行为的通知, 国知发保字[2021]1 号, effective from January 27,
2021, see the link: https://www.cnipa.gov.cn/art/2021/1/28/art_75_156439.html.
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policy 133 and strengthen internal demand as a driver for China’s future economic
development.134
In areas of more open conflicting interests, reform in the direction indicated by
the recent agreements will face more challenges, especially at a time where relations
between China and the U.S. are frayed and the direction of possible policy
realignments under the new U.S. administration are still unclear. We can be sure for
now that on the issue of forced technology transfer, including trade secrets, the
situation will remain uncertain and a reason for tensions.
What does that mean for foreign rights holder? It means that while they will be
likely better protected against unfaithful employees and prying competitors, they will
remain extremely vulnerable to the byzantine complexities of the administrative
apparatus of the PRC and will be further subjected to demands to release valuable IP
in exchange for licenses, permits, and the right to do business in and with China.
Form the enforcement standpoint, foreign holders of trade secrets should now be
less hesitant in enforcing their trade secret rights in China. The hesitation of foreign
businesses to litigate trade secret theft in China is explainable by decades of bad
publicity of the Chinese enforcement system. Although trade secret cases will remain
complex cases due to the lack of a transparent discovery system and for the need to
meet certain thresholds to obtain criminal enforcement, the planned amendments
seem to soften such hurdles, favoring rights holders. Ultimately, whether the amended
system will work to the benefit of foreign rights holders will depend on the latter’s will
to test it. Policymakers should also welcome an increase of enforcement in China as
the best way to test whether they have indeed been successful in changing it for the
better.
The outlook for the protection of foreign trade secrets in China is quite positive at
present, but we still need to remind foreign practitioners and companies that China
has a peculiar litigation system. The lack of a discovery process forces foreign rights
holder to invest on substantial pre-litigation preparatory work, including
investigations, analysis, and evidence acquisition. Also, and very importantly, is how
a rights holder will organize itself internally to protect and secure its trade secret
rights from leaks and theft (confidentiality, contracts, employment policies, software,
know-how creation and development processes etc.). In fact, many of the presumptions
for shifting the burden of proof of infringement rely on the ability of the rights holders
to show he had taken appropriate measures to protect its secrets.
In conclusion, while policymakers will continue work on bilateral relations and
improvements of the China IP macro system, rights holders need not focus on those
issues, but rather on what the real law is and how to effectively use it to win cases and
obtain protection. As always, look at how the law is and as how is should be when
making decisions to enforce trade secrets in China.

133 Frank Tang, What is China’s dual circulation economic strategy and why is it important?,
SCMP (Nov. 19, 2020, 5:30PM), https://www.scmp.com/economy/chinaeconomy/article/3110184/what-chinas-dual-circulation-economic-strategy-and-why-it.
134 CONG. RSCH. SERV., CHINA’S 14TH FIVE-YEAR PLAN: A FIRST LOOK (Jan. 5, 2021),
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11684.

